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In a span of less than 10 months between 1965 and 1966 in Indonesia, 500,000 to 3 million 
people were murdered in an attempted purge of communists by the military. The military 
dictatorship that followed, and the continued power that perpetrators of the genocide hold today, 
produced a silence around the events of 1965. Until recently, scholars only referred to the 
genocide as “mass killings.” After the release of a documentary film by Joshua Oppenheimer, 
The Act of Killing, more people began questioning this history. This thesis investigates the 
question, what lessons should the field of transitional justice learn from Oppenheimer’s films and 
the Indonesian genocide case? My argument is threefold: first, I argue that the Indonesian case 
shows that memory can be a tool of repression. Second, because of memory’s role in repression, 
addressing memory politics after genocide is critical. Third, I assert that memory work like 
Oppenheimer’s documentaries should be part of transitional justice because of its ability to 
dismantle hegemony with an awareness of deep-rooted societal nuances. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover artwork by Issy Wilson 
issywilson.com  
  
Dedication 
 
 
For the victims 
 
“i am sorry this world 
could not keep you safe 
may your journey home 
be a soft and peaceful one” 
Rupi Kaur  
 i 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Writing this thesis has meant more to me than I could have known when I began. This 
thesis is the fulfillment of a dream in iterations - my dream at the end of high school to come to 
the University of Michigan and pursue a degree in international studies, my dream during my 
sophomore year to immerse myself fully in the world of human rights, and my dream one year 
ago to create something that was truly my own. I could not have done this without the countless 
people who encouraged, supported, and inspired me, and I would like to extend my utmost 
gratitude to them. 
   First, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Hadji Bakara, who told me to watch 
The Act of Killing. You set me on a journey that has changed the course of my work and my life. 
I am grateful for your intellect and empathy. I would also like to thank Dr. Anthony Marcum, 
who has always gone the extra mile for his students. You created an environment for me and my 
peers to grow and thrive, and believed in me when I doubted myself. I have always been my best 
self in your classroom. 
I must express my gratitude for Professor David Leupold, who in one short semester 
immersed me in the fascinating world of memory studies. You spoke with me as an intellectual 
equal, and showed me the power of this work.  
I would also like to thank David Caron, Tomasz Cebulski, Krishna Han, Alina Utrata, 
Kieran McEvoy, and many others who were kind enough to give me their time along this 
journey. My favorite part about writing was threading our conversations throughout this thesis. 
 ii 
 
I also need to thank my friends who have been my support system as I learned about 
myself through this process. I would like to give special shoutouts to Tala Taleb and Laurie 
Perrin, who in my most difficult moments remind me that I matter, and that what I put out into 
this world matters. Thank you to Zainab Bhindarwala, Ayah Issa, Ben Freiband, Max Albert, and 
of course, Drew Ramacher for keeping me sane. I needed those study dates, coffee runs, and late-
night rants more than you know. 
I have to go back to where it all started and thank Mr. James Grant at Slauson Middle 
School. Perhaps neither of us knew it then, but your social studies class would forever change 
my life. It was in your classroom that I learned that history matters. It was there I discovered the 
world. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family, from the bottom of my heart. You instilled in 
me the drive and will to succeed, and because of you, I believe that I can do anything. More 
importantly though, you instilled in me great love, and for that I am forever grateful. I love you.  
iii 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction 1
Indonesia in the Twentieth Century 3 
Nusantara 3 
Dutch Colonization 4 
The Fight for Independence 5 
World War II and the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia 6 
The Sukarno Years 7 
The Indonesian Genocide 8 
Suharto and the “New Order” 9 
Uncovering the Truth 10 
What Happened? 10 
Who is Responsible? 11 
Was this Genocide? 12 
Research Question and Methodology 14 
Research Question 14 
Methodology 15 
Structure of the Thesis 17 
II. Transitional Justice from Above 19 
Introduction 19 
Transitional Justice 19 
Legalism 20 
The Nuremberg Trials 20 
The “Canon” of Genocide Cases 22 
The 1990s: Transitional Justice, Criminal Tribunals, and the Rise of Legalism 23 
The Bosnian Genocide 24 
The Rwandan Genocide 24 
The Cambodian Genocide 26 
Limitations and Growing Criticism 27 
Limits of Legalism 27 
Conclusion 29 
III. Memory Wars 30 
Memory Studies 30 
Collective Memory 31 
Cultural Memory 32 
Memory Politics 33 
iv 
Just Memory 33 
Memory and the Present 34 
Collective Memory Shapes the Present 35 
The Present Shapes Collective Memory 36 
Memory Wars: Power and Memory 37 
Delegitimization 37 
Social Silencing 38 
Historical Negationism 39 
Memory Work 40 
Conclusion 41 
IV. Oppenheimer’s Memory Work 43 
The Act of Killing 44 
The Beginning: Unchallenged Memory 45 
The Middle: Challenging Memory 46 
The End: Renegotiated Memory 47 
The Look of Silence 49 
Silenced Memory and Private Mourning 50 
Persistence of Threat 50 
Consequences of Denial 51 
Conclusion 53 
V. The Indonesian Genocide: Present and Future 55 
Introduction 55 
Efforts for Justice in Indonesia Today 55 
The International People’s Tribunal 1965 56 
Local Approaches 61 
Textbooks and Curriculum Revision 62 
Exhumations of Mass Graves 63 
Artistic Expressions 64 
The Way Forward 65 
 1 
 
I. Introduction 
“At 3 AM someone knocked on our door. They called my dad. Mom said, ‘It’s dangerous, don’t 
go out.’ But he went out. We heard him shout, ‘Help!’ Then, silence. They took him away. We 
couldn’t sleep until morning … I was 11 or 12. I remember it well. And it’s impossible to forget. 
We found his body under an oil drum ... His head and feet were covered by sacks but one foot 
poked out like this. That same morning nobody dared help us. We buried him like a goat next to 
the main road. Just me and my grandfather carrying the body - digging the grave, no one helped 
us. I was so small. Then, all the communist families were exiled. We were dumped in a 
shantytown at the edge of the jungle. That’s why, to be honest, I’ve never gone to school. I had 
to teach myself to read and write. Why should I hide this from you? I promise I’m not criticizing 
what we’re doing. It’s only input for the film. I promise I’m not criticizing you.” 
Excerpt from The Act of Killing 
 
 
         For decades, most people who knew about the mass killings in Indonesia between 1965 
and 1966 believed that they were a case of spontaneous violence by thugs and civilians. For 
many it was a closed chapter in Indonesia’s history, overshadowed by almost forty years of a 
military dictatorship. For others, however, it remained an open question. In recent years, 
researchers, advocates, and citizens have worked to uncover the truth of what happened in 1965. 
What they revealed was a highly organized genocide orchestrated by the Indonesian military and 
carried out by paramilitary groups and the police, with the help of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. The genocidaires intended to “purge” accused communists from the 
archipelago (Bevins 2017; International People’s Tribunal 2015; Melvin 2013; Melvin 2017; 
Oppenheimer 2012; Robinson 2018; Simpson 2008). These accused communists were murdered 
en masse, often horrifically tortured or raped before being killed (Kombas Ham 2012; 
International People’s Tribunal 2015). Determining how many people were killed during the 
1965 genocide is difficult; estimates are anywhere between 500,000 and 3 million (Melvin 2017; 
Oppenheimer 2012; Simpson 2008).  
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         In 2012, an American filmmaker released a documentary called The Act of Killing. The 
filmmaker, Joshua Oppenheimer, went to Indonesia to find out what happened in the 1960s 
(Oppenheimer 2012). He asked Indonesians he met about who had committed or conducted the 
mass murders, and learned that these murderers were living amongst everyday citizens, leading  
normal lives as part of society (Oppenheimer 2012). Oppenheimer sought out these men, gaining 
their trust and learning their stories (Oppenheimer 2012). What he did next would lead to the 
unprecedented nature of the documentary and the brutality it exposed: he asked them to create 
scenes about their killings “in whatever way they wished” (Oppenheimer 2012). The films 
examine what it means for society when the oppressors win.  
         Oppenheimer’s documentaries - The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence - are a painful 
exercise in memory, fifty years after the violence. They provide the chance to revisit this 
moment in history. This thesis investigates the question, what lessons should the field of 
transitional justice learn from Oppenheimer’s films and the Indonesian genocide case? I argue 
that revisiting the case of the Indonesian genocide shows how memory can be a tool of 
repression, and thus it teaches the field of transitional justice that addressing memory politics is 
critical. More broadly, the field should prioritize approaches that take into account the nuances of 
the case at hand. Oppenheimer’s films are an example of how memory work can help dismantle 
repressive structures by challenging state-controlled collective memory. 
There is seemingly no better time than the present to study genocide and mass violence; 
while still grappling with the legacies of genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the world 
is watching genocidal violence unfold in Syria, Myanmar, South Sudan, and many other places 
around the world. The current generation and the next will have to deal with the aftermath of 
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today’s genocides. There are still many lessons to learn from previous genocide cases, and 
perhaps by revisiting the past we can find new paths forward. 
         This chapter will provide historical context on Indonesia that illuminates some of the root 
causes of the 1965 genocide. It then describes the research conducted over the past ten years to 
uncover the truth about what happened from 1965 to 1966. This chapter then further discusses 
the research question that drives this thesis, my proposed argument to answer the research 
question, and methodology, and concludes with a roadmap for the next four chapters of this 
thesis.  
  
Indonesia in the Twentieth Century 
Nusantara 
         The Indonesian genocide resulted from both complex local and global dynamics. Before 
Dutch colonization, the area that comprises modern-day Indonesia was part of what some 
historians call Nusantara (Soebadio & Sarvaas 1978). This Malayo-Polynesian term refers to the 
Malay archipelago, encompassing modern-day Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, East 
Timor (Timor-Leste), and the Philippines (Soebadio & Sarvaas 1978). This region was, and still 
is, made up of many ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups (Anderson 1998). Like much of 
Southeast Asia, Nusantara had many layers of influence over time; scholars of Southeast Asia 
describe India’s early influence on the region as “Indianization” (Anderson 1998; Soedjatmoko 
1960). Indianization of Nusantara from the second to the twelfth centuries brought religious and 
cultural influence (Anderson 1998). Traders brought the influence of Islam in the region dating 
back to the thirteenth century, and Islam became the dominant religion on the Indonesian 
archipelago by the sixteenth century (Anderson 1998; Soebadio & Sarvaas 1978). 
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Dutch Colonization 
         Dutch colonization of Indonesia shaped Indonesian society in ways that became critical 
to the onset of genocide in the 1960s. In the sixteenth century, European powers began their 
attempt to dominate the region and take control of its lucrative spice trade; the Portuguese, 
Spanish, Dutch, and British each had a presence in the region (Anderson 1998, Ricklefs 1991). 
The Dutch eventually colonized Indonesia, naming it the Dutch East Indies (Ricklefs 1991). 
Indonesia officially came under Dutch rule in 1800 when the Dutch East India Company, the 
company that expanded the Netherland’s economic presence in the region, was nationalized 
(Pentecost 2013; Vickers 2005). This period in Indonesia’s history is one of exploitation of labor 
and resources by the Dutch, as well as creation of social hierarchies that placed the Dutch at the 
top, Chinese in the middle, and native Indonesians at the bottom (Anderson 1998; Vickers 2005). 
Colonization laid the groundwork for what was to come in 1965 in three ways: the 
influence of colonialism on Indonesian politics, the Dutch’s legacy of violence, and their 
constructed social hierarchy. Debates over Indonesia’s national identity were the foundation of 
the country’s independence struggle during World War II. Conflict over the country’s political 
identity after colonization shaped the Sukarno era leading up to 1965 (Simpson 2008; Vickers 
2005). The Dutch strategy for maintaining power and squashing rebellion in Indonesia included 
the use of native auxiliary forces against native uprisings (Ricklefs 1991; Simpson 2008). The 
Dutch would economically privilege native people who fought for them (Ricklefs 1991). This 
practice of deputizing local militarized groups would be a key characteristic of the independence 
movement and the genocide in 1965 (Simpson 2008). The Dutch enforced a social hierarchy that 
divided the population into “Europeans,” “Natives,” and “foreign Orientals” (Luttikhuis 2013). 
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These three groups were subject to different legal systems, economic opportunities, and schools.  
“Foreign Orientals” mostly comprised ethnic Chinese, who the Dutch privileged due to their 
strategic role in Dutch control of the region; Dutch colonization occurred during a time of 
expansion of Chinese influence into Southeast Asia, and the Dutch saw an opportunity to use the 
Chinese as trade intermediaries with native Indonesians (Liu 2014). An article written in 1930 in 
the journal Pacific Affairs writes that “ the Dutch found [the Chinese’s] presence necessary for 
the exploitation of the islands,” and that “certainly little would have been accomplished in Java 
by the East Indian Company without the aid of the Chinese” (Vandenbosch 1930). This 
positioning of the Chinese within the Dutch social hierarchy was a precursor for the later 
targeting of ethnic Chinese during the genocide and military dictatorship.  
  
The Fight for Independence 
         The divide between “left” and “right” politics in Indonesia were at the center of the 
country’s independence movement, though ethnicity and religion did play a role (Simpson 2008). 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Indonesians debated over political visions of the nation and how 
different elements, such as Islam, Communism, and colonialism, should be prioritized (Simpson 
2008). Sukarno rose to prominence as a leader of the nationalist movement during the 1930s, 
founding the Indonesian independence party Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (Vickers 2005). He 
attempted to bring pro-independence Indonesians together under one ideology in which 
nationalism, religion, and communism all played important roles, calling this idea “Nasakom”: 
nasionalisme, agama, komunisme (Soebadio & Sarvaas 1978). Sukarno’s nationalist vision 
opposed both imperialism and capitalism (Ricklefs 1991). 
  
 6 
 
World War II and the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia 
         The Japanese occupation of Indonesia during World War II had a critical influence on the 
country’s independence struggle and the later military takeover and genocide (Greenlees 2015; 
Han 1998). People’s experiences of the occupation and treatment by the Japanese differed 
greatly depending on their social position during Dutch rule, geographic location, and class 
(Baird 2016; Pentecost 2013). When the Japanese invaded in 1942, many Indonesians welcomed 
them as liberators from Dutch rule (Han 1998). The Japanese collaborated with Indonesian 
nationalists to legitimize their power, forming alliances with leaders like Sukarno (Baird 2016; 
Simpson 2008). The Japanese taught Indonesian revolutionaries their brutal methods of torture 
and murder; military and paramilitary groups would later use these methods during the genocide 
(Robinson 2018; Simpson 2008). The Japanese also brought many young people into militarized 
youth groups, many of whom later became military leaders who gained power during the Suharto 
dictatorship (Robinson 2018). The Japanese occupation, however, was still brutal; Indonesians, 
especially those who lived in strategic areas for the Japanese, were subjected to torture, sexual 
violence, arbitrary imprisonment, murder, and enslavement (Han 1998). When the Japanese 
began to lose the war, they promised independence to Indonesians, though never set an official 
date (Robinson 2018). In 1945, Sukarno and his party, the secular nationalist Republicans, 
declared independence (Simpson 2008). What followed, however, was a four-year independence 
struggle against the Dutch who attempted to reclaim their former colony and Allied forces who 
opposed the independent government as a product of Japanese fascism (Vickers 2005). 
The role of the United States and the United Kingdom during this time set the stage for 
their later involvement in the genocide (Simpson 2008). The United States loaned Dutch forces 
the capital to return to their former colony, considering the independent government to be a 
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communist threat (Robinson 2018). Only after the Republican government crushed a leftist 
uprising in the country did the United States accept Indonesian independence and put pressure on 
the Dutch to accept Indonesian independence as well (Simpson 2008). After these four years, 
now considered the Indonesian National Revolution, Indonesia achieved formal independence in 
1949 (Vickers 2005). Sukarno became the country’s first president (Ricklefs 1991). 
  
The Sukarno Years 
         Sukarno, who led the independence movement, is considered by many Indonesians as the 
Father of the Nation (Hering 2001). On paper, the newly independent country was a 
parliamentary democracy (Robinson 2018). In reality, the first ten years of Indonesian 
independence were full of strife, riddled by conflict over the political vision for the country and 
uprisings by rebel groups (Mietzner 2016; Vickers 2005). In 1959, Sukarno introduced what he 
called “Guided Democracy,” claiming that parliamentary democracy would not work for the 
country (Hering 2001). This policy was, in practice, authoritarian (Simpson 2008). An attempted 
coup by members of the Indonesian Armed National Forces in what Indonesians refer to as the 
30 September Movement ultimately ended the period of Guided Democracy. There is still great 
debate within the literature over the extent of the involvement of the PKI in the coup and 
Suharto’s connection to the coup (Melvin 2017; Roosa 2016; Simpson 2008). 
         Suharto, who would later orchestrate the Indonesian genocide and head the military 
dictatorship that followed it, became a commander and eventually a general in the Indonesian 
National Army during the Sukarno years (Robinson 2018; Simpson 2008). Suharto was inducted 
into the military during Dutch rule and rose to military prominence during the Japanese 
occupation and Indonesian National Revolution (Simpson 2008; Vickers 2005). Suharto quickly 
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blamed the coup and 30 September Movement on the communists, calling for a mass purge of 
communists in the country (Melvin 2017; Roosa 2006). This mass purge of supposed 
communists became the Indonesian genocide (Melvin 2017; Robinson 2018; Roosa 2016; 
Simpson 2008). 
  
The Indonesian Genocide 
         Many details of the Indonesian genocide remain obscured; what research on the genocide 
thus far has made clear, however, is that the genocide was not the spontaneous outbreak of thug 
violence that the military dictatorship asserted it was for decades. Instead, the violence was a 
systematized campaign orchestrated by the Indonesian military with the assistance of the United 
States and other Western governments (Bevins 2017; Komnas HAM 2012; Melvin 2013, 2017; 
Melvin et al. 2018; Robinson 2018; Roosa 2006; Simpson 2018). 
         In the months following the 30 September Movement, the army mobilized paramilitary 
groups and local gangs in mass killings of accused communists. In a matter of months, 
perpetrators of the violence murdered hundreds of thousands of people (Komnas HAM 2012; 
Melvin 2017; Oppenheimer et al. 2012). Most of the people killed were perceived or actual 
members of PKI and its affiliated organizations (Melvin 2017; Simpson 2008). Lists of those to 
be killed came from anti-communist organizations in the country as well as from Western 
intelligence agencies such as the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Roosa 2006; Simpson 
2008). Ethnic Chinese were also targets of suspicion, seen as less patriotic due to their social 
position as a result of their status during Dutch colonization (Melvin 2013). Evidence discovered 
in recent years, as will be further discussed in the literature review, demonstrates that this was a 
state policy planned and trained for well in advance with the assistance of Western governments 
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(Melvin 2017; Simpson 2008; Wilkins 2017). These mass killings were highly organized, 
utilizing military strategy taught by the United States (Simpson 2008; Bevins 2017). Perpetrators 
tortured and killed victims in the most horrific and disturbing ways, as evidenced by the men 
Oppenheimer follows in The Act of Killing (Oppenheimer et al. 2012, 2014). Many of their 
practices were taken directly from the Japanese during their occupation of Indonesia (Simpson 
2008). Perpetrators’ atrocities included mass shootings, live dismemberment, strangling, 
beheading, castration, and stabbing (Oppenheimer et al. 2012, 2014; Robinson 2018). Without 
industrialized methods of violence, perpetrators murdered an estimated five hundred thousand to 
three million people in less than a year (Robinson 2018). 
  
Suharto and the “New Order” 
         The Indonesian genocide is unique in that its perpetrators “won” and still retain political 
power today. The 1965 genocide effectively ended Sukarno’s rule, with General Suharto taking 
over during the genocide (Melvin 2017; Simpson 2008). Suharto officially took power in 1968 
(Vickers 2005). Suharto’s 31-year reign, termed the “New Order,” was one of continued violent 
repression of supposed communists (Melvin et al. 2018). The New Order included silencing of 
“sympathizers” of victims of the genocide (Melvin et al. 2018). The New Order constructed and 
enforced an official narrative of the genocide as spontaneous civilian violence against cruel 
communists who were a threat to the nation (Melvin 2017; Simpson 2008). Suharto’s regime was 
committed to economic development and political order through autocratic and capitalist means 
(Berger 2008; Farid 2005). Many Western governments, including the United States, supported 
the Suharto government (Farid 2005). Repression during the Suharto regime largely contributed 
to the lack of justice for the Indonesian genocide (Farid 2005; Melvin et al. 2018). 
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Uncovering the Truth 
         A handful of academics and practitioners have researched the events of 1965 to 1966 in 
Indonesia. The purpose of most of the research on this period has been to uncover what 
happened; the past ten to fifteen years have been somewhat of a fact-finding mission (Melvin 
2013, 2017; Melvin et al. 2018; Roosa 2006; Simpson 2008, 2018). Literature thus far on the 
Indonesian genocide has centered - and in fact, debated - on three main questions: What 
happened? Who is responsible? And crucially, was this genocide? Less work has been done to 
analyze the implications of this case as a genocide; a gap exists in drawing lessons from the 
Indonesian genocide for the field of transitional justice. With this thesis, my goal is to build on 
recently established empirical knowledge about the Indonesian genocide to evaluate what the 
case can teach us that the field of transitional justice has been missing. 
  
What Happened? 
         A culture of silencing around the events in 1965 has pervaded Indonesian society (Melvin 
et al. 2018). This silencing, in combination with the Suharto government’s intentional obscuring 
of evidence, has made primary sources and physical evidence scarce (Melvin 2017; 
Oppenheimer et al. 2014). Many survivors are reluctant to speak out, even anonymously, 
because they still face threats to their safety today if they do so (Melvin 2013; Melvin et al. 
2018; Oppenheimer et al. 2014). Further, people who were adults during the genocide are in their 
old age now, and many have since passed away. Due to these factors, understanding the details 
of the Indonesian genocide has proved difficult. Academics such as Jess Melvin documented the 
testimonies of survivors, perpetrators, eyewitnesses, and relatives of victims (Melvin 2013, 2017; 
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Melvin et al. 2018). Many survivors and relatives of victims have written on the genocide as 
well, such as Ken Setiawan, whose father was imprisoned without trial (Putu Oka Sukanta 2011; 
Putu Oka Sukanta 2016; Setiawan 2018). Through these testimonies and analyses of the 
genocide and its aftermath, the field is learning more details of the atrocities as well as their 
long-lasting consequences. 
  
Who is Responsible? 
         Throughout the Suharto regime, the government upheld a narrative of the 1965 events 
that described the violence as spontaneous uprisings by citizens (Melvin 2013; Roosa 2006). 
When not erased from history books altogether, official accounts describe the events as an 
uprising by the people against communism, which the military ultimately stopped (Melvin 2017; 
Oppenheimer et al. 2012). Many Indonesians themselves believed this narrative, and for decades 
after the genocide, many scholars of the mass killings believed no evidence existed that 
implicated the military in the killings (Melvin 2013, 2017; Notosusanto 1967). Whether the 
killings were carried out with any state coordination or organization was a main point of debate 
(Melvin 2013, 2017; Roosa 2006). Leo Kuper asserted the government’s involvement as early as 
1981, including the Indonesian case in his study of genocide in the twentieth century (Kuper 
1981). In 2010, Melvin ventured into the archives of the former Indonesian Intelligence Agency 
and asked for their records (Melvin 2017). Analyzing these previously secret documents, Melvin 
found overwhelming evidence of the military’s premeditated planning of the mass killings: the 
military had dubbed this campaign of violence the “Annihilation Operation,” a deliberate state 
policy formulated well in advance of the 30 September Movement (Melvin 2017). The military 
conducted militia and paramilitary training as early as April 1965, gradually putting in place 
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structures for military rule (Melvin 2017; Simpson 2018). The September 30 Movement was 
merely the trigger that the military needed to activate their “Annihilation Operation” (Melvin 
2017; Simpson 2018). Melvin refers to these incriminating documents as the Indonesian 
genocide files (Melvin 2017). 
Melvin’s research, along with the research of Bradley Simpson and John Roosa, also 
uncovered the involvement of international actors in the genocide (Melvin 2017; Roosa 2006; 
Simpson 2008). Documents declassified less than two years ago by the National Security 
Archive demonstrate clearly that the United States did not “stand by” as the violence went on, as 
officials and news media have often reported. Instead, the United States - particularly the CIA - 
was instrumental in the genocide, helping the Indonesian military strategize and providing the 
military with lists of supposed communists (Beech 2017; Simpson 2018). Documented evidence 
shows, however, that US officials viewed the violent crushing of communists in Indonesia as a 
Cold War victory, a country in Asia that was successfully “flipped” (Melvin 2017; Simpson 
2008, 2018; Wilkins 2017). US government officials will vehemently deny any involvement in 
the September 30 Movement or the genocide (Simpson 2008, 2018). The US supported 
Suharto’s military dictatorship for the 31 years it remained in power after the genocide (Simpson 
2008). Great Britain and MI6 have been similarly implicated (Simpson 2008).  
  
Was this Genocide? 
         A central debate in the literature on the Indonesian genocide since its occurrence is 
whether the killings do indeed constitute genocide. Scholars have derived their arguments from 
two main “variables”: existing evidence and the definition of “genocide” they employ (Farid 
2005; Melvin 2013, 2017; Vickers 2005). As much of the evidence for the Indonesian genocide 
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has emerged in the past ten and even five years, scholars in the 1970s to early 2000s mainly 
referred to the genocide as “mass killings” or “massacres” (Melvin 2013). With limited evidence 
of the government’s involvement in the genocide and silenced voices of survivors and their 
families, determining the extent of the killings was difficult (Oppenheimer 2012, 2014; Melvin 
2013, 2017; Melvin et al. 2018, Roosa 2006). Opposition by some scholars to calling the killings 
a genocide were mainly based on the question of intent; by the United Nations’ definition, 
genocide must be any “acts with the intent to destroy” (United Nations 2006). As more evidence 
has emerged that demonstrates organization and premeditation by the Indonesian army, an 
increasing number of scholars and practitioners consider the killings to be genocide. 
Academics have also debated whether the killings can be considered genocide since the 
victims were targeted for their alleged participation in a political party or ideology: communism 
(Melvin 2013; Roosa 2006; Simpson 2008; Vickers 2005). The United Nations’ definition 
articulates four categories of targets of genocide: “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” 
(United Nations 2006). While many victims were indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese, 
some scholars have argued that they were not targeted for their ethnic identity but rather for their 
accused affiliation with communism, which does not fall under any of these definitional classes. 
Jess Melvin and others, however, argue that the mass killings constitute genocide (Melvin 2013; 
Melvin et al. 2018; Robinson 2018; Roosa 2006; Simpson 2008). These scholars present several 
arguments for the Indonesian case being classified as genocide. The first draws on the precedent 
set by the Khmer Rouge tribunals that establish an event can constitute genocide if a case or 
cases of genocide occur during the event as a whole (Melvin 2018). In the Indonesian case, 
evidence of targeting ethnic Chinese in particular areas of Indonesia constitute genocide (Melvin 
2013). The second calls into question the definition of genocide itself. Some scholars are critical 
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of the fact that despite the Indonesian genocide’s comparability to canonical genocide cases such 
as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, it does not fall under the legal definition of genocide 
established after World War II (Melvin 2013, 2017; Roosa 2006; Simpson 2008). Proponents 
call on a moral and sociological understanding of the function of the term “genocide” to 
advocate for the Indonesian genocide being considered as such (Melvin 2013, 2017; Melvin et al. 
2018, Robinson 2018; Roosa 2006; Simpson 2008). 
         In my thesis, I choose to refer to the event as the “Indonesian genocide.” I align my work 
with that of scholars who, with overwhelming evidence of the orchestration and atrocity of the 
killings, believe the events of 1965 to 1966 should be regarded with the same weight ascribed to 
other genocides. The debate over how events come to qualify as genocides will be discussed 
further in the literature review in Chapter 2. I assert that the relegation of the Indonesian case to 
the periphery of genocide studies only furthers its invisibility to the rest of the world and the 
perpetuation of injustice. Understanding the 1965 events as genocide is also critical to analyzing 
the Indonesian case in the context of transitional justice. 
  
Research Question and Methodology 
Research Question 
In this thesis, I attempt to answer the question: What lessons should the field of 
transitional justice learn from Oppenheimer’s films and the Indonesian genocide case? I use a  
multidisciplinary approach that weaves together literature in the fields of transitional justice and 
memory studies, empirical data on the Indonesian genocide, and Oppenheimer’s inventive 
documentary films, recognizing each as uniquely informative evidence. I take a historical and 
sociological approach to existing literature and media on the Indonesian genocide and its 
 15 
 
aftermath, and do an in-depth analysis of both of Oppenheimer’s documentaries through the lens 
of memory studies. 
        Through my research, I conclude first that Oppenheimer’s films demonstrate that control of 
memory is a key tool of repression. Secondly, I argue that addressing memory politics after 
genocide is critical. This thesis establishes that justice does not solely exist in a judicial realm, 
but as well in the collective memory of a people and place. Memory is an active, dynamic, and 
political process steeped in existing relationships of power. Lastly, I assert that memory work 
should be part of transitional justice after genocide because it can dismantle hegemony with a 
greater awareness of societal nuances. Oppenheimer’s films deconstruct hegemony by 
challenging state-enforced collective memory. 
  
Methodology 
         In this thesis, I utilize two main forms of evidence: empirical research on the Indonesian 
genocide, and Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentary films The Act of Killing and The Look of 
Silence. Empirical research on the 1965 to 1966 killings provides factual historical evidence that 
serves as a foundation to investigate narrative and collective memory of the genocide. This 
research comes from peer-reviewed articles and publications by academics like Jess Melvin and 
Bradley Simpson who have spent years studying Indonesia. Utilizing their research provides 
information that I have limited access to, such as archives and interviews with Indonesian 
citizens and political officials. For example, Jess Melvin is the only scholar of the Indonesian 
genocide who went into the Indonesian military archives, a potentially dangerous act. Her 
publications are the only works directly using this evidence. Empirical research on the genocide 
does, however, have limitations. As the Indonesian military and state suppressed information 
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about the genocide for decades and continues to do so today, accessing evidence or even 
testimony of survivors or victims’ families is a challenge. This limitation is where Joshua 
Oppenheimer’s films provide an opportunity.  
 The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence are a window into narrative and collective 
memory in Indonesia. Joshua Oppenheimer spent years building relationships with perpetrators 
and survivors, and it is only because of this that he has access to their private lives and thoughts. 
Oppenheimer enters his subjects’ homes, attends rallies of former perpetrators who maintain 
political power, and follows perpetrators and survivors to the places where mass killings took 
place. The films also acknowledge the influence of Oppenheimer’s presence on the situation, an 
anthropological approach that empirical research does not always take into account. The films 
are, however, subject to Oppenheimer’s lens and his choices. Documentary film is allowed - or 
arguably, recognizes - more subjectivity than empirical research, and thus acknowledging the 
filmmaker’s intentions and positioning is part of using these films as evidence.  
I argue additionally that film is a legitimate form of evidence because even beyond mere 
documentation, film can engage in a unique way with the informal social and cultural aspects of 
post-genocide societies. Film has been critical to transitional justice, and specifically to post-
genocide justice, since the Holocaust. The Nuremberg trials were the first to submit film as 
evidence; the Americans created a documentary that compiled their tape from liberating the 
camps, and thus the film was not only a way of documenting the horrors of the Holocaust but 
also a way of representing and framing the horrors for others (Douglas 2001). The reactions from 
perpetrators in the courtroom demonstrates that the film’s impact went beyond emotional appeal, 
renegotiating perpetrators’ own relationships with their actions (Douglas 2001). The proliferation 
of fictional and semi-fictional Holocaust movies also demonstrates the role of film in post-
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genocide reconciliation (Douglas 2001). In the case of the Cambodian genocide, the biographical 
film The Killing Fields was instrumental in pushing forward stalled justice ten years after the 
genocide (Ear & Duong 2009). Film is uniquely able to engage with memory and other more 
informal social forces, and thus Oppenheimer’s documentaries are important evidence in the 
investigation of transitional justice in Indonesia fifty years after the genocide. 
  
Structure of the Thesis 
The following two chapters establish the conceptual frameworks through which to 
analyze the Indonesian genocide and post-genocide justice more broadly. Chapter 2 serves as a 
literature review of the field of transitional justice, providing the historical context for the field’s 
prioritization of legalism and institutions, to the detriment of cases such as the Indonesian 
genocide. Chapter 3 begins with an introduction to the field of memory studies, with notes on 
terminology including collective memory, cultural memory, memory politics, and just memory. 
These chapters lay the groundwork for my argument that the field of transitional justice must 
recognize the role that memory can play in repression, and the importance of addressing memory 
politics as part of a broader attention to the unique nuances of each post-genocide society. 
         In Chapter 4, I do an in-depth analysis of Oppenheimer’s documentary films, The Act of 
Killing and The Look of Silence (Oppenheimer et al. 2012, 2014). The Act of Killing works to 
dismantle the state-enforced narrative about the genocide by having perpetrators revisit their 
memories. Deconstructing the dominant narrative creates space for other narratives such as the 
victim’s story that Oppenheimer presents in The Look of Silence. I argue that Oppenheimer’s 
films demonstrate the potential of memory work to address deep-rooted societal challenges after 
genocide. 
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         Chapter 5 describes efforts for justice in Indonesia since the release of Oppenheimer’s 
films in 2012 and 2014. It first discusses the International People’s Tribunal of 1965, an event 
organized by activists and Indonesian exiles in the Netherlands. I argue that while the event 
increased the visibility of the Indonesian genocide on the international stage and created a space 
to tell victims’ and survivors’ stories, it was an attempt to map a legalistic framework onto a case 
that did not have the context for it. Chapter 5 then describes several local actions for justice, 
arguing that like Oppenheimer’s films, they better match the realities and nuances of the 
Indoneisan case. This chapter ends with a conclusion of the thesis, summarizing the lessons that 
the field of transitional justice should learn from the Indonesian genocide case.  
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II. Transitional Justice from Above 
“Leaders who do not act dialogically, but insist on imposing their own decisions, do not organize 
the people - they manipulate them. They do not liberate, nor are they liberated; they oppress.” 
Paolo Freire 
 
         This chapter serves as a literature review that examines the broader history of transitional 
justice, demonstrating that the field has historically prioritized institutions and legalism. This 
chapter will argue that the field must reduce its reliance on institutions and legalism, making 
room for other approaches to transitional justice that are better suited to reconcile deep-rooted 
societal challenges after genocide. The first section will look at how the Nuremberg trials formed 
the basis for legalism’s dominance in later transitional justice movements. The second section 
asserts that the dominance of the Genocide Convention’s legalistic definition of genocide creates 
a canon of highly visible cases that guide the transitional justice field, to the detriment of cases 
like the Indonesian genocide that have not been legally defined by the international community 
as genocide. The third section examines the proliferation of transitional justice and the rise of 
legalism in the 1990s in the context of several genocides and conflicts occurring during this 
period. The final section introduces the key debate in the field: the limitations of legalism and 
institutionalization in transitional justice. 
  
Transitional Justice 
         Transitional justice is a relatively new field that is based on both theory and praxis. 
Transitional justice is broadly defined by the International Center for Transitional Justice as “a 
response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights,” and efforts to transition from 
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autocratic or abusive regimes to, purportedly, democracy (ICTJ 2008). The term “transitional 
justice” was coined as early as 1991 (Hinton 2010). Transitional justice emerged as an academic 
field in the 1990s, rooted in the praxis and on-the-ground-realities of genocide and the 
emergence of states from autocratic regimes (Hayner 1994). Since the 1990s, the field has 
expanded to include rebuilding society after mass violence more broadly (ICTJ 2008). The 
approaches of transitional justice, however, were largely informed by cases occurring prior to the 
field’s creation, especially the Holocaust and its aftermath. 
  
Legalism 
         The field of transitional justice, both in theory and praxis, has come to be dominated by 
legalism. Brooks describes this domination of legalism as an “explosion in promotion of the rule 
of law” (Brooks 2003). McEvoy considers legalism to be an attachment to legal standards, and 
the prioritization of legal institutionalization in post-conflict societies (McEvoy 2007). A 
prioritization of legalism does not necessarily mean the promotion of criminal tribunals or other 
criminal proceedings, but rather a general tendency to value the law, legal standards, legal 
institutions, legal habits, and legal actors over other approaches to reconciliation and 
peacebuilding (McEvoy 2007). A focus on legalism is driven by the belief that strengthening 
legal infrastructure in a country is the best way to rebuild other parts of society such as economy, 
culture, and governance (Brooks 2003; McEvoy 2007). 
  
The Nuremberg Trials 
         The legacy of the Nuremberg trials contributed to the prioritization of criminal tribunals 
in transitional justice in the latter half of the twentieth century. I argue, without diminishing the 
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severity of the Holocaust, that this is the result of a broader Holocaust exceptionalism: the notion 
that the horrors of the Holocaust are unique to it and should further serve as the standard for what 
genocide is (Bloxham & Moses 2010). The Nazi regime murdered six million Jewish people, as 
well as hundreds of thousands of other people deemed inferior, including Roma people, people 
with disabilities, LBGTQ+ people, black people, and Jehovah’s Witnesses (United States 
Holocaust Museum).  After World War II, the Allied Forces looked to ways of dealing with the 
atrocities committed by Nazi Germany (Hinton 2010; Teitel 2003). At the same time, many 
political leaders, academics, and civilians saw the post-war world as ushering in a “new world 
order,” in which previous notions of state sovereignty would be subordinate to international law 
and governance (Hinton 2010). What resulted was the Nuremberg Trials (Hinton 2010). The 
military tribunals tried the most prominent leaders of Nazi Germany for offenses including war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. These trials were, arguably, the world’s first attempt to 
prosecute individuals for crimes committed across borders. It also faced challenges of 
prosecuting individuals under laws that did not exist at the time of their crimes (Arthur 2009; 
Kritz 1995). Though these trials at the time did not prosecute specifically for genocidal acts, they 
became a powerful reference point for post-genocide tribunals in the decades after. As Lawrence 
Douglas writes in The Memory of Judgment, “it is the memory of these earlier trials [Nuremberg 
and the Eichmann trial] that creates the hope, if not the expectation, that today’s perpetrators will 
be forced to answer to the law” (Douglas 2001). The Nuremberg trials and later Eichmann trial 
served as “proof” for many early transitional justice practitioners that prioritizing the rule of law 
in post-conflict societies was critical to peace (Kritz 1995; Fichtelberg 2009). The Nuremberg 
legacy also sits within the broader “Holocaust paradigm” as Bloxham and Moses describe it; the 
notion that the Holocaust is unique and “taken as an ‘ideal type’ genocide” (Bloxham & Moses 
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2010). This means that “scholars and advocates of particular cases often seek to fit theirs within 
a ‘Holocaust paradigm’ at the expense of careful contextualization” (Bloxham & Moses 2010). 
This “Holocaust paradigm” has created a canon of genocide cases defined by legalism. 
  
The “Canon” of Genocide Cases 
         In this section, I argue that the legalistic definition of genocide that emerged with the 
Genocide Convention creates a “canon” of genocide cases that only accepts those instances of 
mass violence that have undergone an international legal proceeding and fit a legal definition of 
genocide; this is detrimental to justice for cases such as the Indonesian genocide that are 
comparative in scale and severity to cases in the canon but have not seen criminal proceedings 
and cannot be retrofitted to the Genocide Convention. This canon of genocide cases is an 
extended result of Holocaust exceptionalism and the hierarchization of instances of mass 
violence that followed the Holocaust (Bloxham & Moses 2010). As the Genocide Convention 
was written after the Holocaust, genocides that followed the Holocaust are measured on their 
similarity to the Holocaust (Bloxham & Moses 2010). Bloxham and Moses name a “few 
instances of genocide that, for a variety of reasons, have qualified for the canon of general 
acceptance: alongside the Holocaust, Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, 
and now Darfur tend to be included, but virtually no other cases” (Bloxham and Moses 2010). In 
the next section, I will discuss three cases that occurred after the Holocaust and before the 21st 
century that led to the proliferation of transitional justice: the Bosnian, Rwandan, and 
Cambodian genocides. All three of these well-known cases were at a later point apprehended 
through a criminal tribunal. I argue that transitional justice’s focus on the criminal tribunals of 
these cases is to the detriment of lesser-known cases such as the Indonesian genocide. 
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         The Genocide Convention, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, defines genocide as 
“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children 
of the group to another group” (United Nations 1948). This is intentionally a legal definition, 
created after the Holocaust for the purpose of being able to hold states and individuals 
accountable to an international legal system. This legal definition, however, has become 
authoritative across the board. Despite the fact that this definition was created after a single 
genocide, the Holocaust, it has not been adjusted based on the genocides that followed. The 
result is that the Genocide Convention shapes assessments of mass violence, rather than new 
instances of mass violence adapting the definition of genocide. 
  
The 1990s: Transitional Justice, Criminal Tribunals, and the Rise of Legalism 
         The 1990s saw many instances of mass violence, conflict, and genocide, and is the 
starting place for the field of transitional justice; the dominance of legalism is evident in the 
aftermath of violence during this period. In this section, I will discuss three cases of genocide 
that informed the field at this time: the Bosnian, Rwandan, and Cambodian genocides. While the 
field of transitional justice learned quickly from past mistakes and made new attempts to avoid 
making them again, the field’s insistence on legalism and institutionalization is evident in all 
three of these cases.  
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The Bosnian Genocide 
         The Bosnian genocide was the first case in the 1990s that the international legal system 
attempted to apprehend through an international tribunal, and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) revealed the field’s gaps in understanding local dynamics 
(Hinton 2010). The ICTY, formed in 1993, tried perpetrators of crimes committed throughout the 
region that comprised the former Yugoslavia, including modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia (Hinton 2010). In 1992, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia (Hikmet 2016). In the years that followed, 
Serbian forces carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and 
Croatian people (Hoare 2014). By the end of the war, Serb forces had murdered over 100,000 
Bosniak and Croatians (Donia 2015). Held in the Hague, the ICTY had mixed outcomes and was 
the target of great criticism; it was called lengthy and expensive, too weak, and strong-armed by 
international powers in a setting where the conflict was ongoing (Minow 1998; Hinton 2010). 
Perhaps the most powerful criticism of the ICTY was that it failed to resolve tensions between 
communities, or even exacerbated them (Verovšek 2018). Many considered the ICTY to be 
detached from the reality on the ground, deaf to how members of the community viewed the trial 
(Ivković & Hagan 2017). By the time of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s 
founding, it was evident that criminal justice needed more local consciousness. 
  
The Rwandan Genocide 
         Rwanda’s gacaca courts were the first attempt in the 1990s to be conscious of local 
dynamics in criminal proceedings. The Rwandan genocide took place within the Rwandan civil 
war, a culmination of decades of ethnic division largely created by the Belgian colonial 
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government in the first half of the twentieth century (Semujanga 2003). In 1994, over 800,000 
Tutsi were murdered by government-directed Hutu police and gang groups (Herr 2018). The 
atrocities committed were systematic and widespread, including murder, sexual violence, and 
torture (Costello 2016; Herr 2018). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), like 
the ICTY, was founded by the UN in 1994 (Hayner 1994). The ICTR is often referred to as the 
ICTY’s “sister” trial, given the overlap of the trials and the genocides themselves (Minow 1998). 
Held in Tanzania rather than the Hague, its goal was to establish truth about the crimes 
committed, hold perpetrators accountable, and broker a sustainable transition to a new 
government (Hinton 2010). Learning from the challenges of the ICTY, a new system of justice 
parallel to the ICTR was established post-genocide in Rwanda: the gacaca courts (Hayner 1994). 
These courts were intended to be a localized means of truth-seeking and justice, utilizing local 
practices of transitional justice while also dealing with the issue of volume of cases to be tried in 
the country (Herr 2018). These gacaca courts would ideally bring community members together 
in seeking truth, addressing grievances, and providing restitution following human rights 
violations that took a uniquely personal and brutal face due to the nature of the genocide 
(Costello 2016). The gacaca courts have been both celebrated as a locally conscious system 
standing in contrast to the pitfalls of the ICTY, and heavily criticized as failing to produce 
particular outcomes such as reparations (Hayner 2001; Herr 2018; Hinton 2010; Minow 1998). It 
is not possible here to address the full scope of responses to the gacaca courts, but the key 
takeaway from this case for the purposes of this thesis is that it represents an attempt by the 
international justice system and local actors to solve the issue of local consciousness with a 
localized but still institutionalized and legalistic approach. 
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The Cambodian Genocide 
         The Cambodian genocide occurred almost twenty years before both the Rwandan and 
Bosnian genocides, from 1975 to 1979; its “hybrid tribunal,” however, was not formed until 
2003, and demonstrates a new yet still legalistic attempt to address local needs. The communist 
Khmer Rouge originally came to power as a political party during Cambodia’s civil war, 
overshadowed by the Vietnam War (Ear and Duong 2009). On April 17th, 1975, the Khmer 
Rouge gained control of Phnom Penh, immediately evacuating everyone from the city (Peou 
2017). The Khmer Rouge tortured and killed anyone seen as anti-communist such as doctors, 
teachers, academics, monks, artists, and many others, and forced the rest of the population into 
the countryside where they were subjected to abuse, starvation, and hard labor under the regime 
(Ear & Duong 2009). Between 1975 and 1979, an estimated 1.7 to 2 million Cambodians were 
murdered (Peou 2017). After decades of advocacy by survivors of the Khmer Rouge genocide 
and their allies across the globe, the United Nations, in collaboration with the Cambodian 
government, created Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Trials, formally named the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) (Brinkley 2013). The Khmer Rouge Trials were an 
experiment in a new form of criminal tribunals: mixed (or hybrid) trials (Brinkley 2013). 
Founded in-country with dual support from the UN and the Cambodian government, it was 
another creative attempt to bridge the gap between local actors and the international legal system 
(Sperfeldt 2012). It has been lauded for its respect of the country’s own institutions while 
maintaining international standards (Maguire 2018). It is most heavily criticized, however, for 
being weak and expensive, having only produced three real sentences over sixteen years 
(Brinkley 2013; Sperfeldt 2012; Un 2013). Some scholars and practitioners say the ECCC has 
failed as a mechanism of transitional justice, as the country seems to be sliding back from 
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democratization today (Brinkley 2013; Heder 2011). Other scholars, such as Peter Maguire, 
attribute the ECCC’s failures to politics, rather than the form of the mixed tribunal (Maguire 
2018). The field of transitional justice is still learning from this trial, but it is evident that even 
this localized form of criminal tribunal has its limitations. 
  
Time and again, actors in post-genocide societies have attempted to solve the issues that 
arise from a lack of local consciousness by reconfiguring legalistic institutions. The continued 
limitations of these institutions, however, demonstrates a need to cease reliance on legalism and 
institutionalization as the only means of achieving justice. 
 
Limitations and Growing Criticism 
         As the consequences of earlier genocides and their aftermath have come to light and more 
situations of mass violence have arisen, people engaged in post-conflict justice - some in local 
communities and some international advocates - have criticized the international justice system 
overall. In this section I will address a key debate in the transitional justice field: the limits of 
legalism, and the need for inclusion of other approaches. This thesis will argue that the 
Indonesian genocide case demonstrates the need for transitional justice to recognize the 
importance of tailoring to the specific nuances of a post-genocide society, rathering than insisting 
on legalistic solutions. 
  
Limits of Legalism 
         An ongoing debate in transitional justice is about the limits of legalism; this thesis argues 
that international criminal tribunals are not the only important approach and may not always be 
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the best approach. Legalism, as has been discussed, has been dominant in the transitional justice 
field; with the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002, the international community 
is quick to turn to criminal trials after mass violence (Wilson 2006). Institutions like the United 
Nations and the US Institute for Peace seek to “promote the rule of law” first and foremost in 
many transitional societies (Kritz 1995). In contrast with this, many scholars and advocates 
criticize this prioritization of legalism. McEvoy argues that lawyers think too highly of their role 
in transitional justice and could benefit from what he calls “legal humility” (McEvoy 2007). 
While not disregarding the role of legalism in transitional justice altogether, he calls for lawyers 
and legal practitioners to value and respect other actors and forms of knowledge in post-violence 
societies (McEvoy 2007).  
Brooks examines the consequences of well-intentioned international practitioners, 
criticizing the short-sightedness of applying identical frameworks to cases across the world 
(Brooks 2003). This thesis aligns with to this perspective, arguing that while the International 
People’s Tribunal 1965 in the Hague made strides for visibility of the Indonesian genocide case, 
it attempted to impose a tribunal structure on the Indonesian case without the context for it; the 
government today denies the genocide and the IPT 1965 did not have any real legal structure, 
unsupported by the United Nations or the International Criminal Court. Scholars like Richard 
Wilson take their criticism of legalism a step further, asserting that the field’s focus on legalism 
and the rule of law is imperialist and detrimental to holistic justice (Wilson 2006). Wilson 
describes how the legalization of human rights has caused international practitioners to overlook 
complex historical, political, social, and cultural contexts in which violence occurred. Both 
advocates and community members in post-violence societies of the Global South - such as 
Rwanda, East Timor, and Cambodia - criticize international transitional justice practitioners 
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predominantly from the West for failing to recognize their own role in shaping the political and 
social structures in which violence was bred (Wilson 2006). For example, some scholars, 
practitioners, and advocates argue that in Rwanda, European colonialist “divide and conquer” 
tactics that transcribed hierarchy onto ethnic and tribal affiliations directly influenced the later 
genocide (Semujanga 2003). While this thesis will not discuss the complex legacy of 
colonization on political and social structures in Indonesia, it is critical of the imperialist 
tendency of international transitional justice practitioners to disregard local and grassroots justice 
efforts. Increasingly, a new generation of transitional justice scholars and practitioners are raising 
these criticisms of overlegalization in the field and seeking new frameworks and approaches to 
transitional justice. This thesis seeks to expand the field of transitional justice by introducing the 
Indonesian genocide as a case that offers new approaches. 
  
Conclusion 
         This chapter has illuminated gaps in the field of transitional justice that both disregard the 
Indonesian case as a genocide and disregard non-normative approaches to transitional justice 
being taken in Indonesia today. Holocaust exceptionalism created a narrow and legalistic 
definition of genocide that excludes the Indonesian case from the “canon.” Transitional justice, 
as a relatively new field, has been growing and learning from on-the-ground realities since its 
foundations in the 1990s but continues to insist on legalistic approaches. Increasingly, scholars in 
the field have criticized this prioritization of legalism and institutions. The field’s prioritization 
of international legal interventions has led it to disregard other potentially constructive 
approaches to transitional justice, such as Oppenheimer’s documentaries on Indonesia which 
challenged hegemony through engaging with memory politics.  
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III. Memory Wars 
“All wars are fought twice, the first time on the battlefield, the second time in memory.” 
Viet Thanh Nguyen 
  
         This chapter will introduce concepts in the field of memory studies to argue that the field 
of transitional justice has insufficiently recognized memory as a powerfully influential force in 
post-violence societies. The Indonesian case demonstrates just how large of a role memory 
politics play. In this chapter, I will first introduce the field of memory studies that forms the basis 
for understanding memory politics. I will then argue that memory, rather than being passive or 
static, has an active and powerful impact on the present and future. In the subsequent section, I 
will argue that memory is inextricably linked to power. These arguments serve as the foundation 
for my overall conclusion that the field of transitional justice must recognize the role of memory 
in post-genocide societies, and see memory work as a legitimate approach to transitional justice 
because of its ability to challenge the more informal structures of hegemony.  
  
Memory Studies 
         This section introduces the field of memory studies as a lens through which to understand 
post-genocide Indonesia and defines terms in memory studies that the rest of the thesis will refer 
to. Memory studies is a broad, interdisciplinary field that explores questions about how people 
make meaning of the past; it deals with the interaction between past and present and people’s 
relationship to it (Bosch 2016). The field comprises both theory and praxis, drawing from 
academic disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history and taking form 
in museum studies, archive studies, technology, and the arts (Bosch 2016). Memory studies as a 
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field emerged at the end of the twentieth century, though its foundations lie in scholarship from 
the early twentieth century (Roediger & Wertsch 2008). 
         Memory studies is largely seated within post-Holocaust discourse. Thus, memory studies 
gained traction as a field in the 1980s and 1990s as the children of Holocaust survivors began to 
grapple with the history they had inherited from their parents (Hirsch 2012). As Holocaust 
survivors grew into old age and passed away, discourse shifted from asking what happened in the 
Holocaust to asking how it should be remembered (Hirsch 2012). The growth of the field also 
coincided with a proliferation of movements fighting for the creation of Holocaust memorials, as 
well as memorials for other instances of mass violence such as the Armenian genocide (Ashplant 
2000). The 1980s and 1990s also saw many more genocides and mass violence, further 
solidifying the need to investigate how memory might influence the present (Müller 2002). 
         The field of memory studies formed alongside transitional justice, sometimes intersecting 
on topics such as memorialization and museum studies. For the most part though, memory 
studies has been regarded as a “softer” field in comparison to the formal and institutionalized 
focus of transitional justice (Kritz 1995). While transitional justice has historically been focused 
on institutions, memory studies focuses on culture, social norms, and communities (Roediger & 
Wertsch 2008). I argue that memory politics played a significant role in the aftermath of the 
Indonesian genocides, and thus memory studies, and specifically memory work, should be 
considered important to any transitional justice process. 
  
Collective Memory 
         Collective memory is one of the earliest concepts in memory studies as it was the basis of 
understanding memory beyond the individual, as having impact on society and the present. The 
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term “collective memory” was first coined by Maurice Halbwachs, who argued that people only 
engage memory in relation to others; thus, there is a memory that exists outside of the individual, 
and a society’s understanding of the past is influenced by the social frameworks of that society 
(Halbwachs 1992). Collective memory requires that there is a “collective,” a group of people 
united by at least one characteristic (Halbwachs 1992; Nguyen 2016). Therefore, collective 
memory is key in identity formation, especially in relation to national or ethnic identities 
(Assmann 2008; Suny 2004). In Halbwachs’ definition, collective memory is shaped by 
contemporary interests, agendas, and power dynamics (Halbwachs 1992). In other words, the 
way that a society remembers a war, for example, is largely dependent upon who won the war, 
which political parties exist today, and upon what identities people were divided (Halbwachs 
1992; Nguyen 2016; Suny 2004). The concept of collective memory was built upon the theory of 
history called historical materialism championed by Walter Benjamin who argued in his “Theses 
on the Philosophy of History” that historical “events” are not self-evident and are rather deemed 
important based on what people value in the present (Benjamin 1968). People contemporarily 
impose a structure of meaning on the past (Benjamin 1968). This premise, that the present is 
deeply intertwined with the past, will be discussed more in the following section on memory and 
the present. 
  
Cultural Memory 
         Cultural memory is a form of collective memory that relates specifically to a people’s 
cultural identity. Jan Assmann built off of Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory in his 
definition of cultural memory in his work “Communicative and Cultural Memory” (Assmann 
2008). Assmann considers cultural memory to be an institution, describing it as “exteriorized, 
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objectified, and stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the sight of 
gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent” (Assmann 2008). Cultural memory manifests in 
objects such as monuments, museums, rituals, icons, and other external symbols (Ashplant 2000; 
Assmann 2008). 
  
Memory Politics 
         The concept of memory politics, also known as memory wars, builds on both collective 
and cultural memory (De Brito et al. 2001). The term “memory politics” relates memory to 
power, conflict, and resources (De Brito et al. 2001; Müller 2002). One can think of memory as a 
field upon which people battle over legitimacy, political dominance, and economic control 
(Müller 2002). Memory politics is the struggle over who gets to ascribe meaning to the past, and 
what meaning they ascribe (Müller 2002; Nguyen 2016). Memory politics are thus deeply linked 
with identity (Longley 2013; Suny 2004). 
  
Just Memory 
Just memory is an ethics of memory put forth by author Viet Thanh Nguyen in his 2016 
publication, Nothing Ever Dies. Just memory is aware of the complex ethics of remembering and 
remembers both one’s own and others (Nguyen 2016). This ethics of remembering builds off the 
post-modernist historical tradition that criticizes the notion of objectivity, asserting that each 
person has a subjective lens and that there is no knowable “past” (Apperley 2018; Aylesworth 
2015). Just memory recalls the memories of all people involved, bringing forth the forgotten to 
remember alongside the rest (Nguyen 2016). Just memory actively seeks what may have been 
forgotten and attempts to understand why (Nguyen 2016). Nguyen articulates that collective 
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memory relies on an identified “collective,” a group to call “us” (Nguyen 2016). Having a 
defined identity upon which to include people in this collective means there is an exclusionary 
aspect to collective memory (Nguyen 2016). Nguyen argues that collective memory can never be 
completely inclusive (Nguyen 2016). He describes competing “ethics of memory”: remembering 
one’s own or remembering others (Nguyen 2016). Remembering one’s own is often about 
remembering the victors, or those who would like to see themselves as victors; in the case of the 
Vietnam War, the collective American memory of the war is one that justifies the war itself, 
places Americans in a moral position, and forgets those outside of the collective, the non-
Americans: the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and others who were tied up in the war 
(Nguyen 2016). Nguyen sees remembering others as an ethos of those who denounce war, 
calling for remembrance of the victims and marginalized (Nguyen 2016). Yet, Nguyen argues, 
this produces a similar judgment to remembering one’s own; in this case, “we” are the bad guys 
and “the other” are the good guys (Nguyen 2016). Nguyen argues that the antidote to unjust 
practices of memory is not to stop remembering, but rather to renegotiate the memory and our 
relationship to it (Nguyen 2016). He calls for an approach that recognizes and interrogates who 
controls memory and how memory is abused (Nguyen 2016). The final section of this chapter 
will argue that memory work should strive toward just memory. 
  
Memory and the Present 
         In this section, I will describe the ways that memory interacts with the present in general, 
arguing that memory has a dualistic relationship with the present: collective memory shapes the 
present, and the present shapes collective memory. In this way, memory is not static, objective, 
or passive, but rather actively negotiated in the present context of societies. Booth eloquently 
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states that “though memory is of the past it also very much belongs to the present: in how it 
shapes our understanding and sensibilities and in how it can be called into the service of our 
present projects” (Booth 2009). This understanding of memory will become important when 
studying the contemporary implications of the Indonesian genocide which occurred over fifty 
years ago. Understanding memory’s relationship with the present and future is critical to seeing 
its importance for transitional justice. 
 
Collective Memory Shapes the Present 
         Collective memory can influence and shape society in the present. De Brito et al. write 
that “the impossibility of ensuring a perfect process of transitional truth and justice means that 
the past continues to live in the present … hence the ‘Vichy Syndrome,’ the ‘Vietnam complex’ 
in the United States, and the various German terms for working through the past, all of which 
indicate that the past is a disease of sorts, a burden on the present” (De Brito et al. 2001). 
Memory, in this way, is active in the present; it is not simply the story people tell about the past, 
it influences their behavior in the present (De Brito et al. 2001). Collective memory about a 
historical event shapes how people construct the history leading up to the present, and further, 
how they envision the future (Benjamin 1968; Assmann 2008; De Brito et al. 2001). De Brito 
continues to say that “even after it has ceased to become a part of the active political agenda, the 
past can continue to be a source of conflict in the judicial arena and of latent or overt deep-seated 
social animosities” (De Brito et al. 2001). Unresolved tension in collective memory plays out in 
memory wars in the present; this is clear in Indonesia where present hatred of communists is 
rooted in their association with the mass killings in the country’s collective memory (Melvin et 
al. 2018, Müller 2002). This hatred becomes institutionalized through anti-communist laws and 
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policies (Melvin et al. 2018). Booth writes, with hope, that “memory can also change, or be 
moderated, so that it no longer disturbs the present” (Booth 2009). This is the motivation behind 
memory work, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
 
The Present Shapes Collective Memory 
         Contemporary society can shape people’s collective memory of the past. This philosophy 
on the relationship between memory and the present is rooted in historical materialists’ assertion 
that the significance of historical events is not self-evident, but rather determined retroactively 
from the present (Benjamin 1968). Benjamin writes that “to articulate the past historically does 
not mean to ‘recognize it the way it really was.’ It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes 
up at a moment of danger” (Benjamin 1968). He refers to the way that people construct memory 
each time they remember. He argues that memory is instrumentalized in the present by political 
actors for a specific ends. As memory is about ascribing meaning to the past, memory is 
constructed when it is relevant and holds value for the present (Benjamin 1968). Douglas writes 
that Gideon Hausner, the lead prosecutor of the 1961 Eichmann trial, believed that the trial 
“would turn the public into witnesses of the witnesses - thereby creating a vital organic link to 
the past. This mindfulness of the past was meant, in turn, to support the Zionist politics of the 
present” (Douglas 2001). Establishing a collective memory of the past through the trials served a 
political end. In the next section, I will describe how wars over memory reflect struggles for 
power in the present. 
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Memory Wars: Power and Memory 
         Memory is inextricably linked with power, and can be used as a tool of hegemony. To 
achieve justice in Indonesia, one must understand the role that memory plays in upholding 
hegemony. There are countless ways that power is manifested in memory wars; in this section, I 
will discuss three main ways that are evident in Indonesia: delegitimization, social silencing, and 
historical negationism. 
  
Delegitimization 
         Collective memory has the power to delegitimize certain groups of people by putting 
bounds on the “collective.” Nguyen argues that collective memory relies on a “collective that 
extends only to family, tribe, and nation” (Nguyen 2016). Collective memory means that an “us” 
exists, at odds with “them”; whether this “us” and “them” are explicitly defined depends on the 
case at hand (Assmann 2008; Nguyen 2016). The legitimacy of the collective relies in part on the 
delegitimization of those who lie outside of it. De Brito et al. describe how “myths and memories 
define the scope and nature of action, reorder reality, and legitimate power holders. They become 
a part of the process of political socialization, teaching people how to perceive political reality 
and helping them to assimilate political ideas and opinions” (De Brito et al. 2001). When 
collective memory becomes an authoritative telling of history, those who wish to tell that history 
differently lose legitimacy in society (Bond & Gilliam 1994). Benjamin articulated this in 
different terms, arguing that historicism, which assumes the objectivity of the framing of 
historical events, empathizes “with the victor,” and “empathy with the victor invariably benefits 
the rulers” (Benjamin 1968). Those who currently hold political power instrumentalize memory 
by enforcing as objective a collective memory of past events that maintains their power (Bond & 
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Gilliam 1994). De Brito et al. describe this as a “strong partisan rendering of the history and 
socio-cultural properties of subjugated and oppressed peoples,” arguing that “power and 
economic domination establish one rendering of history and culture as objective and ethically 
neutral and another as subjective and partisan” (De Brito et al. 2001). By establishing their own 
understanding of history as the only objective and legitimate narrative, people in power 
effectively delegitimize any voices that challenge that narrative (Bond & Gilliam 1994; Müller 
2002). This tactic is evident in Indonesia and will be discussed in Chapter 4 with regard to 
Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentary films. 
  
Social Silencing 
         Collective memory that is hegemonic and institutionalized leads to social silencing of 
voices that speak against that collective memory. In the collective memory of Indonesian society, 
the genocide was civilian-initiated violence in retaliation against communists for the attempted 
coup, and often even as a necessary measure to uphold democracy in the country (Melvin et al. 
2018). This collective memory is reinforced by those in power often through violence or threat of 
violence. Bond and Gilliam argue that “social constructions of the past are crucial elements in 
the process of domination, subjugation, resistance, and collusion” (Bond & Gilliam 1994). 
Memory, as social constructions of the past, serve to mobilize individuals for a particular 
political end; in Indonesia, this means that people impose consequences upon those individuals 
who challenge the collective memory (Bond & Gilliam 1994; Melvin et al. 2016). These 
consequences range from social humiliation to violence. The threat of these consequences is 
often enough to keep people from challenging the hegemonic collective memory. Another 
example of this is in Poland; in January 2018, the government passed a bill banning any blame of 
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the Polish government for crimes committed in the Holocaust (John 2018). The bill would 
charge offenders with “three years in prison or a fine for accusing the Polish state or people of 
involvement or responsibility for the Nazi occupation” (John 2018). This is despite evidence and 
testimony about the participation of Polish citizens in the atrocities of the Holocaust (John 2018). 
Though few people have actually been convicted under this law, the threat of consequences is 
enough to cause a “chilling effect” - the mass quieting of speech and discourse on the topic 
(Askin n.d.). The chilling effect is even more pronounced in Indonesia after a decades-long 
authoritarian regime; as will be discussed in Chapter 4, The Look of Silence reveals how deep the 
consequences of social silencing truly are. 
  
Historical Negationism 
         Hegemonic collective memory is often institutionalized through historical negationism in 
official historical accounts. Historical negationism is the falsification of history through the 
distortion of facts and evidence (Ranalletti 2010). Historical negationism can take form in school 
textbooks, laws, and museums or memorials (Melvin et al. 2018). In Indonesia, the curricula 
taught in schools upholds the narrative that the genocide was a series of spontaneous mass 
killings of communists by civilians in retaliation for the attempted coup (Melvin et al. 2018; 
Oppenheimer 2014). Most schools teach that though the killings were terrible, they were 
necessary to sustain democracy in the nation (Oppenheimer 2014). This stands in contrast to the 
evidence that has since come forth revealing the Indonesian government’s role in orchestrating 
the violence, and the role of the military in carrying out the massacres (Melvin et al. 2018). 
Institutionalizing collective memory in this way gives it power that can even withstand evidence. 
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         Memory plays an active role in power struggles in the present. It can be used as a tool to 
delegitimize target groups and uphold a politically expedient narrative by silencing voices 
outside of the hegemonic collective memory. Memory is often used to uphold hegemony through 
historical negationism in official accounts. This demonstrates that memory is not, in fact, a 
peripheral element of post-genocide challenges, but instead deeply integral to societal dynamics 
after genocide. Thus, memory work, which will be discussed in the next section, is crucially 
important to transitional justice. 
  
Memory Work 
         Memory work is critical to transitional justice because it addresses the nuances of post-
genocide societies that manifest in memory. Memory work is that which attempts to interrogate, 
renegotiate, or reconcile collective memory and people’s relationships with that memory. I argue 
that the best memory work has an ethics of just memory (Nguyen 2016). In the next chapter, I 
will argue that what Oppenheimer accomplishes through his documentaries demonstrates the 
effectiveness of memory work and the importance of addressing memory politics as part of 
transitional justice. 
         Memory work can take many forms. Memorialization, which is considered a transitional 
justice approach, is but one form of memory work that attempts to bring awareness of and 
legitimacy to a particular historical narrative, typically that of the victim of violence (Ashplant 
2000). Memory work can also be done through artistic means such as film, photography, 
literature, fine art, or public art. One example of this is the graphic artist Daniel Rarela’s effort to 
publicize lesser-known texts from Martin Luther King Jr. that stand in contrast with what he 
considers “whitewashed” narratives of MLK’s philosophy (Mic Staff 2017). For Martin Luther 
 41 
 
King Jr. Day in 2017, Rarela created a series of social media-friendly graphics depicting images 
of MLK or images of contemporary Black Lives Matter actions with quotes from MLK’s “Letter 
from a Birmingham Jail” (Mic Staff 2017). With his work, Rarela strove to deconstruct the 
instrumentalization of a particular memory of MLK that opposes modern-day anti-racism 
movements (Mic Staff 2017). This kind of memory work renegotiates a society’s collective 
memory of an event, place, or people in pursuit of a more just memory. Oppenheimer does the 
same through film; The Act of Killing, for example, is a microcosm of Indonesian society’s 
collective memory. By having perpetrators revisit and reconstruct their memories, the film 
dismantles the state-enforced collective memory. The ability of memory work to tackle deep-
rooted societal challenges demonstrate the need for the field of transitional justice to recognize 
the importance of addressing memory politics after genocide. 
  
Conclusion 
         In this chapter, I introduced the key concepts of collective memory, cultural memory, 
memory wars, and just memory that form the basis for my argument about memory’s role in 
transitional justice. I argued that memory has a dualistic impact on the present, both shaping 
contemporary society and shaped by it. Thus, memory is neither passive nor objective, but active 
and influenced by politics in the present. I discussed the key yet often overlooked relationship 
between power and memory after genocide. Memory has real consequences in the present, as 
collective memory can be used as a tool of hegemony. Finally, I presented memory work as a 
solution to deconstruct hegemonic memory. Memory work has a large role to play in transitional 
justice because of its ability to address more informal structures of hegemony in society. In the 
next chapter, I will argue that Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentaries and their influence on 
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Indonesian society demonstrate the need to address memory politics as part of transitional 
justice.  
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IV. Oppenheimer’s Memory Work 
“I refuse to comfort myself with the moral lie that these men have done something monstrous, 
and consequently are monsters, and therefore I am not like them.” 
Joshua Oppenheimer 
 
 
This chapter examines the central evidence of this thesis: Joshua Oppenheimer’s films 
The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence. Through a critical film analysis using the lens of 
memory studies, the chapter concludes that The Act of Killing dismantles the state-controlled 
collective memory present in Indonesian society by having perpetrators revisit their memories, 
creating space in the collective memory for other narratives like the victim’s story presented in 
The Look of Silence. The chapter argues that these films are examples of memory work that 
address the role that memory politics has played in the aftermath of the Indonesian genocide.  
Joshua Oppenheimer is an American filmmaker with ties to the Netherlands and 
Indonesia (Weiner 2015). Originally visiting Indonesia for a documentary project on factory 
workers and unions, Oppenheimer ended up spending five years in the country learning about the 
Indonesian genocide and its repercussions over fifty years that persist today (O’Hagan 2015). 
From the onset, the movies were intended to not only be for both Indonesian and foreign 
audiences, but be both Indonesian and foreign projects. All dialogue in the films is in Bahasa 
Indonesia (the Indonesian language) with English subtitles, and each movie was released under 
an Indonesian title in-country: Jagal (for The Act of Killing) and Senyap (for The Look of 
Silence). In both films, there is an anonymous Indonesian director alongside Oppenheimer. Their 
identity is kept secret for their safety, which is evidence of why this movie had to be initiated by 
someone from outside the country. Oppenheimer first set out to film survivors and families of 
victims, but after threats from the military, was encouraged to try and speak with perpetrators 
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instead. To his surprise, they proudly described the atrocities they committed in 1965 
(Oppenheimer February 2014). He spoke with and filmed countless perpetrators, and this journey 
birthed what became The Act of Killing, released in 2012. 
 
The Act of Killing 
The Act of Killing dismantles the dominant collective memory about the genocide in 
Indonesian society by having perpetrators revisit their own memories. This film was a project 
developed from Oppenheimer’s time in Indonesia beginning in 2004. The film was mostly shot 
between 2005 and 2011 in Medan, North Sumatra (Whittaker 2013). Oppenheimer gains the trust 
of Anwar Congo, a man who is rumored to have murdered thousands during the genocide, and 
his friends Herman Koto and Adi Zulkadry (Oppenheimer 2012, Weiner 2013). These men 
embody and articulate the state-enforced collective memory of the 1965 genocide that is 
dominant in Indonesia: the violence was the fault of cruel communists, and the men who 
murdered them are national heroes who saved people from their wrath. They speak about their 
killings openly and proudly. When Oppenheimer tells them to reenact their killings in any way 
they wish, the men decide to make their own movie in the style of the American westerns and 
gangster movies they idolize; as the documentary progresses, however, the perpetrators’ movie 
morphs with the documentary itself (Oppenheimer 2012). The Act of Killing is about the 
Indonesian genocide, but it is really about the consequences of impunity and lack of justice over 
fifty years. By revisiting their memory of the genocide, the perpetrators reconstruct it, and this 
process dismantles their former memory and therefore dismantles the state-enforced collective 
memory. 
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The Beginning: Unchallenged Memory 
 The beginning of The Act of Killing shows that the perpetrators’ memory of the 
Indonesian genocide reflects the state-enforced narrative about this history; this is a consequence 
of their impunity for over fifty years. The perpetrators see their killings as admirable brutality, 
and talk about the killings much like how someone might talk about a violent video game. One 
of the most famous scenes of the movie is in the first ten minutes, when Congo energetically 
demonstrates to the camera his former technique of strangling people to death with wire 
(Oppenheimer 2012). This is an act of showing off; not only is he proud of what he has done, he 
wants others to validate his sense of power. The scene shows how desensitized Congo is to the 
violence of his killings; this desensitization is created by the state-enforced collective memory 
that writes people like Congo as heroes, and talks about their killings as heroic acts rather than as 
horrific brutality. 
In one scene, driving down the street in a convertible, Zulkadry, smiling and laughing, 
reminiscently brags to Congo about the “Crush the Chinese Campaign”: “All along Surdiman 
Street, I killed every Chinese person I met. I stabbed them! I don’t remember how many, but it 
was dozens. If I met them, I stabbed them” (Oppenheimer 2012). He expresses no shame or 
solemnity when talking about these killings. His killings were a demonstration of power, and the 
way he talks about them in the movie reveals that the power he holds is still unchecked.  
These scenes are perhaps the most striking evidence of the consequences of these men’s 
impunity over fifty years. These men show no remorse or internalization of the atrocity of their 
actions. The memory they hold is glorified, bathed in the heroic narrative of the military 
dictatorship. For the past fifty years, these men have lived in a country that does not see their 
actions as wrong, and in fact, often celebrates them. The beginning of The Act of Killing sets the 
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stage for the memory work of the rest of the film, showing that its subjects’ own memory is 
shaped by their impunity and the state-enforced collective memory. 
 
The Middle: Challenging Memory 
 The Act of Killing deconstructs the state-enforced collective memory by having 
perpetrators engage with their own memories; through the process of staging reenactments of 
their killings, they renegotiate their relationship to their memories. Almost halfway through the 
movie, Congo, Hoto, Zulkadry, and their friends are reenacting an interrogation of a communist 
victim. After shooting one scene, Zulkadry pauses to remark, “Listen, if we succeed in making 
this film, it will disprove all the propaganda about the communists being cruel and show that we 
were the cruel ones! … We must understand every step we take here” (Oppenheimer 2012). This 
prompts a conversation between Zulkadry and Koto about what their movie means for the 
nation’s collective memory. This moment is the first time in the movie that the perpetrators begin 
to discuss their memories in relation to morality; Koto asks, “But why should we always hide our 
history if that’s the truth?” (Oppenheimer 2012). To this, Zulkadry responds that “not everything 
that is true should be made public” (Oppenheimer 2012). These men recognize that the nation’s 
collective memory of 1965 relies on portraying them as heroes while portraying the victims - the 
communists - as cruel. For the first time, they question their own relationship to the state-
enforced collective memory that has benefitted them.  
In the same scene, one of Congo and Zulkadry’s friends, a man who worked at the 
newspaper publishing office where Congo and Zulkadry did most of their killings, expresses 
surprise at the reenactments. Incredulously, he shares, “Now, seeing your reenactment, I realize 
you were so smooth that even me, a journalist with such sharp senses, I never knew!” 
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(Oppenheimer 2012). In his memory of the 1965 events, he is ignorant to the murders happening 
on the floor just above where he works. Earlier in the film, however, the viewer learned that the 
publisher was directly involved in the murders; Congo tells Oppenheimer that “when [the 
publisher] had the information, he’d say ‘guilty!’ and we’d take them away and kill them” 
(Oppenheimer 2012). Zulkadry and Congo challenge their friend; Congo tells him outright, 
“your publisher directed the torture,” and Zulkadry remarks, “this man, a journalist distancing 
himself from these things, that’s predictable. But logically, something we didn’t hide, how could 
he not know? Even the neighbors knew! Hundreds were killed, it was an open secret” 
(Oppenheimer 2012). In the process of creating reenactments together, the perpetrators compare 
their memories of this past, forcing some to reconstruct their memories. This friend who would 
like to see himself as detached from the violence was forced to confront his own role in the 
atrocities. The Act of Killing serves as a microcosm of Indonesia’s collective memory about the 
genocide, so by showing perpetrators’ process of deconstructing their memories, the film also 
deconstructs the broader collective memory. 
 
The End: Renegotiated Memory 
 By the end of The Act of Killing, the perpetrators have renegotiated their memories, 
pulling back the veil of the dominant narrative enforced by the state. The second to last scene of 
the documentary depicts Congo and Koto reenacting an interrogation and torture of a communist, 
this time with Congo playing the victim (Oppenheimer 2012). Congo sits in a chair, fake blood 
painted across his face, as Koto yells at him and pretends to hit him with a wooden object 
(Oppenheimer 2012). Softly, Congo says “cut,” pausing the scene to take deep breaths as Koto 
brings him a bottle of water (Oppenheimer 2012). They resume the scene, with Koto “killing” 
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Congo using the same method of wire strangling that Congo demonstrated at the very beginning 
of the film (Oppenheimer 2012). Before Koto finishes, Congo wordlessly motions to him to stop, 
saying almost in a whisper: “I can’t do that again” (Oppenheimer 2012). Later, when Congo 
rewatches the scene, he asks Oppenheimer, “Did the people I tortured feel the way I do here?” 
(Oppenheimer 2012). Oppenheimer responds, “Actually, the people you tortured felt far worse”; 
Congo looks at him with confusion and what appears to be dawning realization as Oppenheimer 
continues to explain, “because you knew it’s only a film. They knew they were being killed” 
(Oppenheimer 2012). Congo thinks about this for a moment and replies with tears, “Have I 
sinned? I did this to so many people, Josh” (Oppenheimer 2012). By the end of the film, no 
longer does Congo live in the bliss of the state narrative about the 1965 events. By placing 
himself in the shoes of his victims, an act only allowed by the choice to reenact his actions, 
Congo is revealed the truth of his violence. Perhaps surprisingly, Congo praises the movie today, 
calling it “honest and true”; Oppenheimer says that this means he achieved his goal of giving 
“him pause to look at himself in the mirror” (Shatz 2015). His memory of the genocide had 
previously remained untouched, unquestioned for fifty years. Oppenheimer’s film is remarkable 
in its ability to renegotiate this memory so long after the events. 
 
 The memory work that The Act of Killing does goes beyond documentary convention by 
getting genocide perpetrators to revisit and renegotiate their memory of the Indonesian genocide. 
At the beginning of the film, the viewer sees that the genocide perpetrators’ perception of their 
own actions reflects the collective memory enforced by the state. By telling Congo and the other 
perpetrators to reenact their killings, the film asks them to revisit their memories, and therefore 
reconstruct them. As the perpetrators go through the process of staging these reenactments, they 
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question their relationship to their memories and by extension, to the state narrative about the 
genocide. The result is that the movie reveals the falsehood upheld by the perpetrators that the 
state narrative relies on, and deconstructs that narrative. By putting the state-enforced narrative 
into question, Oppenheimer tears open the nation’s collective memory, making room for other 
narratives to enter. Work like Oppenheimer’s that challenges hegemony in its underlying, social 
forms is critical to transitional justice; without an environment that allows for many voices in 
society, it is unlikely that normative transitional justice approaches such as tribunals will be 
effective.  
 
The Look of Silence 
 Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2014 sequel to The Act of Killing, called The Look of Silence, 
presents the story of a victim through the eyes of his brother on a journey to confront 
perpetrators and seek closure; the film does memory work by revealing the consequences of 
hegemony in memory. The Look of Silence was released two years after The Act of Killing, and 
Oppenheimer says that it completes what The Act of Killing started by sharing the experience of 
a victim (O’Hagan 2015, Shatz 2015). The footage in The Look of Silence was taken during 
roughly the same time as the footage in the first film. The Look of Silence follows Adi Rukun’s 
journey to find answers about his brother, Ramli, who was murdered before he was born. 
Sometimes against the wishes of his family, Adi decides to confront the men who killed his 
brother yet live in the same town and live normal lives, having faced no consequences for their 
actions. Oppenheimer does memory work by showing the traumatic repercussions of Ramli’s 
murder on his loved ones, and the lasting consequences of the state’s enforced narrative about 
the genocide.  
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Silenced Memory and Private Mourning 
 The Look of Silence shows its audience how Ramli’s family has had to remember him 
and mourn in private because of the silencing of victims in Indonesian society. The first minutes 
of the documentary contain a voiceover of Adi’s mother speaking to her murdered son; almost a 
whisper, it sounds like a prayer, meant to be heard by no one: “Your mom misses you, Ramli. I 
haven’t seen you for so long. I still see you in my dreams. You can see me but I can’t see you. I 
wish I could see you” (Oppenheimer 2014). Her loss is heartbreaking; yet, she must keep her 
pain to herself and cope with it privately. When asked how she feels about living surrounded by 
her son’s killers, she says “When we meet them in the village - we don’t speak. I hate them,” but 
goes on to say that “it’s up to God. Those people can do what they like. They destroyed so many 
people. Now they enjoy life. But just wait. In the afterlife, their victims will take revenge. They 
will suffer later. There’s no use raising it now” (Oppenheimer 2014). Without any justice for her 
son Ramli and the persisting impunity of perpetrators, Adi’s mother has found her own way to 
cope with the loss, looking to God. As Adi begins to confront his brother’s killers, it becomes 
evident why his mother thinks there is no use in raising the issue of this injustice now.  
 
Persistence of Threat 
 The Look of Silence demonstrates that a consequence of fifty years of impunity and 
hegemony is that survivors and the families of victims still face threats of violence. When Adi 
visits the leader of Komando Aksi, the paramilitary group in his region, he tells the man that his 
brother was killed and as the leader of Komando Aksi, he must be responsible (Oppenheimer 
2014). When the man says he cannot be held responsible as he was removed from Ramli’s direct 
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killers, Adi suggests that the man is “avoiding his moral responsibility” (Oppenheimer 2014). 
The man then proceeds to ask Adi which subdistrict his brother lived in, and when Adi refuses to 
tell him, the man accuses Adi of doing secret communist activity (Oppenheimer 2014). Adi 
calmly asks, “If I came to you like this during the military dictatorship, what would you have 
done to me?” (Oppenheimer 2014). The man replies, “You can’t imagine what would have 
happened” (Oppenheimer 2014). Even in the present, decades after the genocide, perpetrators 
remain in power to an extent that they can still threaten the families of victims. They accuse 
people of being communist as if they are still in the 1960s, and this is a viable threat.  
The behind-the-scenes strategy of Adi’s visits with perpetrators further shows the reality 
of threats to survivors and families of victims today. In an op-ed in 2014, Oppenheimer said that 
his intention was to make a movie about survivors first. After some time working with survivors, 
however, the military “found out what we were doing and threatened the survivors about 
participating” (Oppenheimer 2014). Survivors then encouraged Oppenheimer to try and speak 
with perpetrators instead. Only after years of building relationships with perpetrators was 
Oppenheimer able to work with Adi safely, and even then, Adi’s family had to relocate after the 
film’s release. Oppenheimer’s relationships with perpetrators in powerful political positions 
serves as a safety guarantee when Adi speaks to perpetrators with less political power (O’Hagan 
2015). 
 
Consequences of Denial 
As Adi confronts perpetrator after perpetrator, the audience realizes he will never get the 
closure he deserves; this leaves the audience with a sense of the injustice that persists in 
Indonesia today. In one scene, Adi confonts M. Y. Basrun, the speaker of the local legislature 
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and former secretary general of Komando Aksi, the local paramilitary group that carried out 
many of the mass killings. Adi tells Basrun that many people were killed at Snake River, a local 
site of many of the mass killings. Basrun replies that “the mass killings were the spontaneous 
action of the people.” Adi asks, “Aren’t you just saying this because you’re in the legislature?” to 
which Basrun responds, “No, I’m setting the record straight.” Adi challenges him again, 
suggesting that maybe “the crime [is] so big you don’t want to admit it?” Basrun still denies this, 
saying, “No, I don’t think it’s big” (Oppenheimer 2014). Finally, Adi tells Basrun that his 
brother was a victim murdered by Basrun’s men, at which point Basrun rolls his eyes and asks 
Adi, “Do the victim’s families want the killings to happen again?” When confronted with the 
reality of his actions, Basrun refuses to admit his wrongs or take responsibility. He upholds the 
falsified, state-enforced narrative that the killings were spontaneous violence by the people 
against evil communists. Even when Adi tells him to his face that he took part in killing someone 
Adi loves, Basrun responds not with remorse but instead with a threat to Adi and his family.  
A scene in the last ten minutes of the movie shows Adi’s father, who is deaf and blind, 
lost in the courtyard of his own home. Alone and afraid, he calls out, “Where am I? … How did I 
get here? Help me! I’ve wandered into a stranger’s house” (Oppenheimer 2014). The scene feels 
like a break from the rest of the movie, which mostly consists of shots of Adi on his own or in 
conversation with perpetrators. This scene of Adi’s father was actually filmed by Adi, and he 
says it is the moment he “realised it was too late for [his father]. He would die with the trauma 
from Ramli’s murder, and he would never heal, because he had forgotten the son whose murder 
destroyed our family” (O’Hagan 2015). The consequence of the lack of acknowledgment from 
perpetrators seen in the rest of the movie is that victims and their families are unable to heal. The 
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scene is a painful representation of the lasting and sometimes permanent consequences of 
genocide and impunity. 
 
The Look of Silence is an intimate look at one narrative that has long been silenced in 
Indonesian society. The film shows its audience the pain of a family that has lost a son to the 
genocide, and the further trauma of being silenced by fear. Memories like those that Adi’s family 
holds of Ramli are not part of the collective memory of society because there has been no justice 
and perpetrators still have impunity today. The movie also displays the threat that survivors and 
their families still live in fear of; even after fifty years, perpetrators can still make viable threats 
because they remain in positions of power. The Look of Silence does not give its audience any 
satisfaction; by the end of the movie, no perpetrators have acknowledged the consequences of 
their actions. The film ends with a sense of the injustice that persists in Indonesia today. The Act 
of Killing, by deconstructing the nation’s collective memory, made room for narratives like The 
Look of Silence. Oppenheimer’s hope is that by telling the story of one victim, it can make room 
for others (O’Hagan 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
 The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence were released in Indonesia and internationally; 
Indonesians are able to watch the films digitally, as well as at film screenings that have occurred 
across the country since the movies’ releases. The government, however, opposes the film; on 
many occasions, “private showings have been shut down by police and violently disrupted by 
Islamist and anti-Communist militant groups,” and the “government and anti-communist 
organisations continue to try to stop [the movies’] distribution” (Bjerregaard 2014; Emont 2015). 
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When The Act of Killing was nominated for an Academy Award in 2014, however, the 
government was forced to respond publicly. Presidential spokesman Teuku Faizasyah criticized 
the film, saying that it portrays Indonesia as a “cruel and lawless nation ... as backwards, as in 
the 1960s” (Pulver 2014). It has been less than ten years since the movies were released, and thus 
it is difficult to ascertain the true impact these movies have had on collective memory amongst 
Indonesians today. Examining the pervasiveness of The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence in 
discourse and collective memory in Indonesia could be an opportunity for future research. 
The Act of Killing does memory work by blowing apart the state-enforced collective 
memory in Indonesia through the transformation of perpetrators’ memories; this created space 
for other narratives like The Look of Silence that showed the lasting and painful consequences of 
genocide and continued impunity. These films go beyond the convention of human rights 
documentaries, instead pushing their subjects and viewers alike to engage with their memories of 
violence. For transitional justice institutions such as tribunals to be effective, practitioners must 
understand the nuances of post-genocide societies. Memory work like Oppenheimer’s delves 
deep into the nuances and deconstructs memory politics.  
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V. The Indonesian Genocide: Present and Future 
“Dimana bumi dipijak disana langit dijunjung.” 
Where the land is stepped, there the sky is upheld. 
Indonesian proverb 
 
Introduction 
         This final chapter will describe actions taken for justice for the Indonesian genocide 
today, arguing that the field of transitional justice should focus on approaches tailored to the 
nuances and reality of the post-genocide society in question. The first section will enumerate 
efforts for justice in Indonesia today, including details on the International People’s Tribunal 
1965 in The Hague in 2015. The chapter argues that this event was a prime example of trying to 
appeal to the conventions of transitional justice by mapping a legalistic framework onto a case 
that does not have the context for it. The chapter then highlights local approaches to justice in 
Indonesia today including textbook and curriculum revision, excavations, and artistic 
expressions. The last paragraphs of this chapter conclude the thesis, offering final thoughts on 
the lessons to be learned from the Indonesian case. 
  
Efforts for Justice in Indonesia Today 
         This section will discuss efforts made in recent years for justice for the Indonesian 
genocide, beginning with one of the most significant endeavors that came to fruition in 2015: 
The International People’s Tribunal 1965 (IPT 1965 2015). After describing the ideation, 
formation, and outcomes of the IPT 1965, I argue that while it was important for raising global 
awareness and allowing for truth-seeking driven by survivors and families of victims, the event 
was an attempt to appeal to the legalist mindset of transitional justice by mapping a legal 
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framework onto a structure without legal power. This section then highlights several local 
approaches to transitional justice, many of which do memory work, including textbook and 
curriculum revision, excavations, and artistic expressions. I argue that though these kinds of 
efforts may receive less attention in the international transitional justice sphere, they are critical 
to Indonesian transitional justice and should be recognized as such. 
  
The International People’s Tribunal 1965 
         The IPT 1965, held in The Hague in 2015, had a role in raising global awareness and 
creating a platform for survivors to tell the truth of what happened during the Indonesian 
genocide; it did, however, try to pose as a legal institution even though that did not match with 
the reality. In a sense, the IPT 1965 was “playing tribunal” - on the surface, it had all the 
elements of a tribunal, but without any real legal structure or weight. This section will examine 
the path to the IPT 1965, its structure and process, and its outcomes, ultimately arguing that it 
tried to apply a conventional transitional justice approach that did not suit the Indonesian case. 
  
Forming the IPT 1965 
         The motivation for a tribunal for Indonesia in 2015 came out of the government’s 
repeated unwillingness to admit the crimes of 1965 or attempt to reconcile them. An informal 
meeting in 2013 in The Hague between Joshua Oppenheimer and human rights activists and 
Indonesian exiles in the Netherlands sparked discussion of the possibility of a tribunal (Santoso 
& van Klinken 2017). They discussed the impact of The Act of Killing in the country, as well as 
efforts for justice thus far. Acknowledging that there was little hope of government action, the 
group saw a need for another intervention. In 2014, the International People’s Tribunal 
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Foundation was founded, including Indonesian exiles, human rights activists, and international 
researchers. This group would organize the IPT 1965 held in The Hague the following year 
(Santoso & van Klinken 2017). 
  
The Tribunal 
         The IPT 1965 was held in the Nieuwe Kerk, an exhibition venue, in The Hague over four 
days in November 2015 (IPT 1965 2015). This event had the elements of past international 
tribunals: it had prosecutors and judges, held hearings with testimonies from survivors and 
scholars, and accepted submissions from civil society leading up to the event. Despite its 
appearance as a tribunal, however, it was held without any official or legal support from the 
United Nations or International Criminal Court. It had no power to enforce, and thus its 
organizers called it a “trial of inquiry,” with a mission of truth-seeking (Santoso & van Klinken 
2017).  Its stated mission was 
“to determine whether these events amounted to crimes against humanity, to express a 
conclusion on whether the state of Indonesia and/or any other state should assume 
responsibility for these crimes and to recommend what may be done in the interests of 
lasting and just peace and social progress in Indonesia” (IPT 1965 2015). 
Indonesian and international scholars, as well as civil society organizations in Indonesia, 
compiled a research report of over six hundred pages providing documentary material and 
evidence leading up to the trial (IPT 1965 2015). The panel of seven judges was presided over by 
Zak Yacoob, the former Chief of the South African Constitutional Court from 1998 to 2013, and 
Indonesian human rights lawyer Todung Mulya Lubis headed the prosecution team (Santoso & 
van Klinken 2017; IPT 1965 2015; Constitutional Court of South Africa). Indonesia, the United 
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States, the United Kingdom, and Australia were all invited to participate or make submissions to 
the tribunal, but none accepted the invitation (IPT 1965 2015). More than 20 witnesses came 
forth to provide testimony during the tribunal, some with their identities concealed due to 
continued threats to the safety of survivors and advocates (IPT 1965 2015). Scholars of the 
Indonesian genocide, including Jess Melvin and Bradley Simpson whose research has been 
extensively cited here, gave testimony as well (IPT 1965 2015). Though the IPT 1965 conducted 
itself as a tribunal, it did not hold weight in any official capacity. 
  
Outcomes of the IPT 1965 
The IPT 1965 judges concluded that the mass killings were a case of genocide, and found 
Indonesia guilty on nine counts of crimes against humanity: “(1) Murder, (2) Enslavement, (3) 
Imprisonment, (4) Torture, (5) Sexual Violence, (6) Persecution, (7) Enforced Disappearance, (8) 
Hate Propaganda and (9) Complicity of Other States” (IPT 1965 2015). The tribunal found the 
US and the UK guilty of complicity (IPT 1965 2015; Santoso & van Klinken 2017). These 
findings were issued in a final report in July 2016 detailing the evidentiary, legal, and theoretical 
basis of their ruling (IPT 1965 2015). In their report, the judges enumerated four criteria that 
deemed the Indonesian case a genocide: 
1. The military’s acts fell within the provisions of the Genocide Convention, 
2. The acts were committed against a protected group (a national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
group), 
3. The acts were “committed with the specific intent to destroy that group in whole or in 
part,” and 
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4. The state of Indonesia is bound by the 1948 Genocide Convention as a member of United 
Nations (IPT 1965 2015). 
Perhaps the most significant stance by the judges was their application of Raphael Lemkin’s 
original definition of genocide in 1943: “the destruction of the national identity of the oppressed 
group [and] the imposition of the national identity of the oppressor” (IPT 1965 2015; Lemkin 
1944). Positioning themselves in agreement with proponents of genocide designations for the 
Argentina and Cambodia cases, the judges chose a broader definition of genocide (IPT 1965 
2015). The judges’ definition goes against historical convention which asserts the perpetrator 
must be part of a group outside of the victim group (IPT 1965 2015). Using this stream of logic 
and the protection of “national groups” under the Genocide Convention, the judges argued that 
the military intended to destroy Indonesian communists, and therefore intended to destroy part of 
the Indonesian national group (IPT 1965 2015). The tribunal did not, however, decisively 
conclude whether attacks on Chinese people constituted genocide with ethnic motivation (IPT 
1965 2015). The judges did recognize that “ethnic motives played a role in mass killings of 
Chinese-Indonesian citizens as well, particularly in Medan, Makassar and Lombok,” so “to the 
extent that they were killed because of their Chinese identity, their murders would plausibly 
amount to genocide under the Genocide Convention” (IPT 1965 2015). The final report 
expressed a need for further investigation into this particular issue (IPT 1965 2015). In its ruling, 
the IPT 1965 judges went against norms in transitional justice by applying a definition of 
genocide that went beyond the Genocide Convention. Though this has great discursive 
significance with regard to the Indonesian genocide, the judges’ conclusion holds no legal weight 
nationally or internationally. The judges presented it as a ruling, but their conclusion serves as 
more of a recommendation. 
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Indonesian Government Response 
         The outcome of the tribunal with regard to the judges’ final recommendation has been 
unsuccessful. The judges recommended that the Indonesian state do the following: 
(a) apologize to all victims, survivors, and their families for the commission by the State of all 
the crimes against humanity and other crimes committed in Indonesia in relation to the 1965 
events; (b) investigate and prosecute all crimes against humanity; (c) ensure appropriate 
compensation and reparation to victims and survivors (IPT 1965 2015). 
At the time of this thesis, the Indonesian government has not done any of the above. 
From political and government officials, there was an overwhelmingly negative response 
(Santoso & van Klinken 2017). The current president since 2014, Joko Widodo has refused on 
multiple occasions to make an apology. At a public commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of 
the murders of the six generals killed in 1965, Widodo made clear there would be no apology, 
saying, “Who should forgive whom when both sides claim to be victims?” (Emont 2015). 
Without recognition of the genocide, it seems unlikely that the government would go so far as to 
investigate or prosecute crimes of 1965 or issue reparations. The IPT 1965, however, did see 
coverage by Indonesian news outlets such as the Jakarta Post that also reported the tribunal’s 
ruling of genocide (Yosephine 2016). This momentum helped spur greater dialogue and 
investigation by civil society. 
  
International Response 
         International reactions to the IPT 1965 were generally positive and supportive of the 
tribunal’s findings. Media outlets such as the BBC, CNN, Aljazeera, and TIME reported the 
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tribunal’s 2016 ruling of genocide (Aljazeera 2016; BBC 2016; Kwok 2016; Perry 2016). The 
IPT 1965 raised the profile of the Indonesian genocide on the international stage. The accused 
governments (the UK and the US), however, have not made any formal apology for their 
participation and complicity in the genocide (Simpson 2017). Particularly in the US, where 
recent declassified documents have proved the active role of the US in the genocide, the lack of 
formal recognition is disappointing for many (Simpson 2017). 
  
         The IPT 1965 asserted on a global stage that the Indonesian genocide was indeed a 
genocide, raising the profile of the Indonesian case, and creating public space for survivors’ and 
victims’ stories. It was not, however, the tribunal that it purported to be; it did not hold the legal 
weight of a tribunal or have any support from international institutions, and did not put the 
pressure on the Indonesian government that a tribunal might. Perhaps more significant are the 
local transitional justice approaches that Indonesian activists have taken since the IPT 1965. In 
the next section, I will enumerate some local approaches that have been taken toward 
reconciliation, justice, and peacebuilding. 
  
Local Approaches 
         This section will highlight several approaches that Indonesian activists and citizens have 
taken for justice for the Indonesian genocide, arguing that these efforts should also be regarded 
and respected in the field of transitional justice for their ability to address deep-rooted social 
challenges after genocide. While there have been many forms of activism around the 1965 
genocide, this section will detail three approaches: textbook and curriculum revision, 
exhumations, and artistic expressions. 
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Textbooks and Curriculum Revision 
         Textbooks and curriculum revision in Indonesia are a form of memory work; historically, 
Indonesian textbooks have either left the genocide out entirely or have told the state’s official 
story. Oppenheimer shows the audience this particular aspect of memory in The Look of Silence; 
in one scene, Adi’s son sits in a classroom listening to his teacher say that “the communists were 
cruel, so the government had to repress them,” and, referring to the perpetrators of the genocide: 
“Let’s thank the heroes - who struggled to make our country a democracy” (Oppenheimer 2014). 
In 1963, before the genocide, the government passed a law called the Law on Securing Printed 
Materials Whose Content Could Disrupt Public Order (Buchanan 2010). Throughout the Suharto 
dictatorship, this law came to mean a ban on any books that did not agree with the government’s 
official story about 1965 (Schonhardt 2012). Even after the fall of the Suharto regime, hostility 
toward perceived communists - including victims and survivors of the genocide - led to mass 
book burnings (Forbes 2007). In 2010, however, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court declared this 
law unconstitutional and struck it down (Buchanan 2010; Schonhardt 2012). While the law has 
had a long-lasting chilling effect, there has been a movement for textbook revisions since the 
Constitutional Court ruling as well as the IPT 1965’s ruling of genocide (Schonhardt 2012; 
Santoso & van Klinken 2017). A publisher in Java called Ultimus has released several memoirs 
of victims and survivors of the Indonesian genocide, and both Indonesian and non-Indonesian 
writers of banned books have pushed against the current government’s continued attacks 
(Schonhardt 2012; Yulius 2016). The head of the Indonesian Teacher’s Association, Ratna 
Hapsari, has been leading efforts to revise the history curriculum (Schonhardt 2012). While the 
government continues to resist efforts to introduce more truthful texts into schools, teachers have 
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found other ways to incorporate this material into their classrooms through other resources, 
including those online (Schonhardt 2012). Teachers like Hapsari have been incorporating the 
collections of memoirs published by Ultimus in their classrooms as well (Putu Oka Sukanta 
2011, 2016). By attempting to change the way that Indonesia’s history is taught to the next 
generation, activists in Indonesia are engaging in memory work that attempts to dismantle the 
government’s enforced memory of the 1965 events. 
  
Exhumations of Mass Graves 
         Since the end of the Suharto regime, activists have attempted to find and exhume mass 
graves from the killings in 1965; these efforts both provide physical evidence of the genocide 
and can help to reconcile the events for victims, survivors, and their families. After the genocide, 
many residents knew where mass killings occurred in their towns and villages, but could not 
speak about them out of fear for their safety (McGregor 2010). In 2000, two years after the fall 
of the military dictatorship, an organization called the Foundation for the Research into Victims 
of the 1965-66 Killings (YPKP) exhumed a mass grave in Central Java (McGregor 2010; 
Santoso & van Klinken 2017). This exhumation gave community members and families of 
victims the opportunity to witness physical evidence of the mass killings, and to give some of the 
murdered a proper burial (McGregor 2010). The attempt at reburial after the exhumation in 
Central Java, however, was met with attacks - members of a group called the Kaloran Muslim 
Brotherhood blocked proceedings to the burial site and attacked the cars carrying the remains to 
be buried, removing the remains and tossing them out (McGregor 2010). This attack cast doubt 
on the possibility of future identification and excavation of mass graves. Indeed, this was the 
only exhumation before the IPT 1965 (McGregor 2010). In 2016, President Joko Widodo called 
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for the government to identify mass graves. The government has since failed to carry through on 
this (Harsono 2017). The tribunal’s organizers, however, along with survivors and activists, have 
identified about 120 mass graves in Java alone (Santoso & van Klinken 2017). A group called 
the 1965 Murder Victims Research Foundation has also been involved in such efforts (Harsono 
2017). Exhuming mass graves now is critical as over time, remains will become even harder to 
identify. Exhumations both provide important physical evidence and can be part of the healing 
process for survivors and families of victims. 
  
Artistic Expressions 
The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence demonstrated the power of art as an approach 
to transitional justice, and many people in Indonesia have taken a similarly artistic approach to 
representing, revisiting, and reconciling the Indonesian genocide. Through literary fiction, 
theater, film, and fine arts, Indonesians have grappled with the legacies of the genocide. This 
section will examine one initiative in particular that stands out as an example: The Papermoon 
Puppet Theatre in Yogyakarta (Lis 2018). The Papermoon Puppet Theatre is a group that does 
performances for audiences of all ages that grapple with the pain and legacy of the Indonesian 
genocide. In Indonesia, puppetry has been a tradition for centuries with an art form called 
wayang kulit, or shadow puppets. These intricately cut out puppets are a way to tell stories of 
mythical origin, but have also been used historically for political ends (Lis 2018). Combining 
this tradition with more global forms of puppetry, the Papermoon Puppet Theatre “focus[es] on 
the stories of individuals which might resonate with the experiences of audiences as people who 
were either bystanders to the violence in their communities or affected by it in their family or 
community circles” (Lis 2018). One performance named Mwathirika explores themes of loss and 
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suffering after the genocide. The group spoke with people in their own communities to weave 
together stories that formed Mwathirika. Much like Oppenheimer’s films, this performance 
“does not pass judgment …. instead, [it] describe[s] the impact of historical events upon the life 
of individuals, families, and an entire generation brought up in those years” (Lis 2018). The 
Papermoon Puppet Theatre does similar memory work to Oppenheimer’s films, connecting 
deeply with their own communities. While puppet theatre is unconventional compared to the 
institutions of transitional justice that the field prioritizes, it can be an effective approach to 
engaging with collective memory of communities. 
  
Textbook and curriculum revisions, exhumations, and artistic expressions are just several 
of the many ways that Indonesians have pushed for justice for the Indonesian genocide. Each of 
these strategies plays a unique and critical role. Grassroots approaches like the ones described 
here have the complex and nuanced understanding needed to reshape culture and informal social 
structures. These local approaches are important to justice for the Indonesian genocide, and serve 
as an example for the kind of work that the field of transitional justice should support more 
moving forward. 
  
The Way Forward 
         This section will conclude both the chapter and this thesis by articulating how the field of 
transitional justice should learn from the Indonesian genocide case. This thesis investigated the 
question: What lessons should the field of transitional justice learn from Oppenheimer’s films 
and the Indonesian genocide case? Through an in-depth analysis of The Act of Killing and The 
Look of Silence with supporting evidence from empirical research on the genocide, this thesis 
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argues for three main lessons the transitional justice field should learn from the Indonesian 
genocide case: 1) memory can be a powerful tool of repression, 2) addressing memory politics is 
critical to transitional justice after genocide, and 3) memory work should be part of transitional 
justice after genocide because it can dismantle hegemony with a greater awareness of societal 
nuances.  
 The Indonesian genocide case demonstrates that memory can be a powerful tool of 
repression. This genocide is unique in that the oppressors “won,” remained in power over forty 
years, and retain social and political power today. Historical negationism, the falsification of 
historical facts, was a key tool for the military dictatorship to retain power. By enforcing a 
narrative about the genocide that blamed the communists for the violence, portraying them as 
evil and cruel, the state silenced the victims of their regime. This state-sanctioned narrative 
became part of Indonesian collective memory so that even after the end of the dictatorship, 
survivors and families of victims are still silenced. The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence 
show that survivors and families of victims still face viable threats from former perpetrators who 
still hold political power. The democratic government today continues to deny the genocide, 
upholding the dictatorship’s narrative. 
 The impact of memory politics on justice for the Indonesian genocide demonstrates how 
necessary it is to address it as part of transitional justice. Joshua Oppenheimer’s films reveal 
memory’s active and powerful impact on the present, and how it is inextricably linked to power. 
The work that The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence did to challenge the national narrative, 
and therefore Indonesia’s power dynamics, strove for just memory: an ethics of memory that 
recalls the memories of everyone involved in an event. The Act of Killing dismantled the 
dominant narrative that shapes Indonesian society in order to make space for a multitude of 
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narratives. Creating this kind of environment is necessary to the success of transitional justice 
approaches like tribunals; the safety of open dialogue is critical to truth-seeking and 
reconciliation. 
 Memory work like Oppenheimer’s should be part of transitional justice after genocide. 
Recognizing the role of memory in post-genocide societies is part of a broader need for the field 
of transitional justice to deeply understand the informal dynamics that often determine societal 
outcomes. In places like Indonesia where formal structures for justice are absent at the 
government level, the transitional justice community must recognize the importance of bottom-
up approaches like memory work. More broadly, the field must allow for non-legalistic 
approaches to take priority if it best suits the case. The IPT 1965, while significant in its creation 
of an international platform for survivors to speak, was a prime example of practitioners forcing 
a legalistic framework onto a case that it did not make sense for. 
 This thesis addressed lessons from the Indonesian genocide for the field of transitional 
justice, but was limited in its ability to assess the status of justice in Indonesia today. 
Investigation of the impact of Oppenheimer’s films in Indonesia and assessments of ongoing 
transitional justice efforts in the country are potential areas for future research. The field must 
have a critical eye toward its own efforts across the world and the limitations its priorities impose 
on each case. The way that the field of transitional justice grapples with the aftermath of 
previous genocides such as the Indonesian genocide will inform the outcomes of conflict and 
violence currently happening in the world. By revisiting approaches to past genocides, perhaps 
the field can find new paths to peace today.   
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